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ORDINARY CLIENTS, OVERREACHING
LAWYERS, AND THE FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT ADEQUATE CLIENT
PROTECTION MEASURES
LESLIE

C.

LEVIN*

Every year, thousands of individual clients are victimized by overreaching
lawyers who overcharge clients, refuse to return unearned fees, or steal their
money. For more than forty years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has
considered, and often proposed, client protection measures aimed at protecting
clients from overreaching lawyers. These measures include requirements that
lawyers use written fee agreements in their dealings with clients and rules
relatingto fee arbitration,client protectionfunds, insurancepayee notification,
and random audits of trust accounts. This Article examines what happened to
these ABA recommendations when the states considered them and assesses the
current state of client protection in the United States. It reveals that many
jurisdictions have declined to adopt these recommendations or have adopted
variations that do not adequately protect vulnerable clients. As a result, most
states do not require lawyers to use written fee agreements and in most
jurisdictions, ordinary clients have no meaningful recourse when fee disputes
arise because lawyers are not requiredto participatein fee arbitration.While all
states have established client protectionfunds to help reimburse clients who are
victimized by their lawyers, many clients are not sufficiently compensated due to
some funds' low caps on recovery. At the same time, most states have declined to
adopt other client protection measures that would help deter and detect lawyer
defalcations. Why has this failure to protect ordinary clients occurred? The
answer appears to be, in part, that state courts have paid insufficient attention
* Hugh Macgill Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I thank
Susan Fortney for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am also
deeply grateful to University of Connecticut Law Librarians Adam Mackie, Tanya
Johnson, Maryanne Daly-Doran, and Anne Rajotte for their invaluable research
assistance.
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to these issues or deferred to the state bars. The state bars have sometimes opposed
these measures or implemented them in ways that inadequatelyprotect the public.
States with mandatory state bars-which are sometimes deeply involved in the
rulemaking process-appear more likely to adopt fewer client protection
measures. The Article suggests that if state courts will not act to better protect
ordinary clients, then state legislaturescan and should do so.
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INTRODUCTION

Individual clients are often vulnerable. When they hire a lawyer, it
may be the first and only time they do so. These clients are frequently
seeking help with problems that deeply affect their lives, such as
criminal, family, or personal injury matters. Some end up in disputes
with their lawyers over money. Every year, thousands of clients are
victimized by overreaching lawyers who overcharge or refuse to return
unearned fees.1 Some actually steal client money. Of course, there are

1. The precise number is not known. However, from 2017 through 2019, thirteen
jurisdictions reported that their client protection funds paid an average of 1,279 claims
annually for unearned fees. See AM. BARASS'N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., SURVEY OF LAWYERS'
FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, at 8 (2020) [hereinafter SURVEY OF LAWYERS'
FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/2017-2019-cpsurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WK9-V2M5]. This figure does not include claims for
unearned fees in the other thirty-eightjurisdictions. Nor does it include unearned fees
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rules of professional conduct governing the ways in which lawyers are
required to handle client money.2 The penalties when lawyers violate
those rules can be severe.3 Nevertheless, problems with fee disputes
and overreaching lawyers continue to occur. Forty years ago, the
American Bar Association (ABA) began to recommend that states
adopt additional "client protection measures" to better protect clients'
financial interests and provide recourse for clients who were victimized
by their lawyers.4 Unfortunately, most jurisdictions have declined to
adopt many of those measures or did so incompletely. The reasons
why this has happened and the consequences for ordinary clients have
been largely unexplored.
The failure to adequately protect these clients occurs from the outset
of the lawyer-client relationship. Most jurisdictions do not require
lawyers to put their fee arrangements (except contingent fees) in
writing. Yet the absence of written agreements makes fee disputes
more likely, and many individual clients cannot afford to litigate the
disputes in court. Consequently, clients may be unable to obtain the

that were eventually repaid by lawyers or instances of fee overcharging that were
subsequently resolved.
2.

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.15 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2020).

3. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1158 (NJ. 1979) (stating that in
misappropriation cases, "mitigating factors will rarely override the requirement of
disbarment"); CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 2-47A (2021) (providing that knowing
misappropriation of client's funds shall result in disbarment for a minimum of twelve
years).
4. The ABA identifies several measures aimed at protecting clients' financial
interests as "client protection measures" including, inter alia, mandatory fee
arbitration, trust account overdraft notification, insurance payee notification, random
audits of trust accounts, and client protection funds. See Client ProtectionInformationResources by Topic, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/committeescommissions/standingcommitteeonclientprotection/
clientprotectioninformation. The ABA also describes most of these measures and
written fee agreements as "loss prevention" rules. SURVEY OF LAwYERs' FUNDS FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42-49. In this Article, the term "client
protection measures" is used to refer to all of these measures.
5.

AM. BARASS'N, STATE BY STATE ADOPTION OF ABA CLIENT PROTECTION PROGRAMS

1-3
(2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional-responsibility/stateby_state_cp_programs.pdf.
6. The exception is articles that discuss the failure to require written fee
agreements. See Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee
Agreement Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 93, 95-96 (1998); Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules
for Lawyers: The ProfessionalResponsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 365, 40305 (2013).
7. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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return of unearned fees or feel forced to pay fees they do not owe.
While most jurisdictions offer fee arbitration when disputes arise, the
vast majority do not follow the ABA's Model Rules for Fee Arbitration
recommendation, which would require lawyers in fee disputes to
participate in arbitration.' Many jurisdictions have also failed to
implement certain other ABA-recommended client protection
measures-such as the Model Rules for InsurancePayee Notification and
the Model Rule for Random Audit of Lawyer Trust Accounts-that would
help deter lawyer theft of client money or facilitate detection.' And
even though all states and the District of Columbia have established
client protection funds to reimburse clients for unearned fees or stolen
money that is otherwise unrecoverable, many do not even attempt to
fully compensate clients, as the ABA recommends.10
To be clear: the focus here is on client protection measures that help
protect ordinary individuals. Large corporate clients do not, for the
most part, need this protection. They are sophisticated consumers of
legal services with significant clout." Large corporate clients will
almost certainly require a written engagement agreement in the
unlikely event that their law firm does not offer to provide one.12 These
clients have the financial resources to sue their lawyers over legal fees.
If their lawyer steals or overcharges, the lawyer's law firm will often
make the corporate client whole. 13 It is individual clients-typically less

8. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 184, 199 and accompanying text. The only significant client
protection measure most states have adopted is trust account overdraft notification.
See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
10.

See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION pmbl, r. 3(a) (AM.

BAR ASS'N 1989); AM. BAR ASS'N, DIRECTORY OF LAWAYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION
(2020)

[hereinafter

DIRECTORY

OF

LAWYERS'

FUNDS

FOR

CLIENT

PROTECTION],

https://www.
americanbar. org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional-responsibility/cp_di
r_fund.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9GG-TU7X];
infra notes 165,
168-69
and
accompanying text.
11. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799, 816-

17, 872, 879-80 (1990).
12. Corporate clients often wish to insert their own terms into the agreements
governing lawyer representation. See Max Welsh, Lawyers Should Negotiate Outside Counsel
Guidelines, LAw PRAC. TODAY (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lawpracticetoday.or
g/article/lawyers-negotiate-outside-counsel-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/RLY4-

QH6D].
13.

See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same:

Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior-In-House

Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REv. 679, 713
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sophisticated users of legal services-who can least afford to lose their
money to lawyers and who most need these client protection
measures.1 4
The organized bar bears some-but by no means exclusiveresponsibility for the failure to adequately protect these clients. On the
national level, the ABA plays a very important role in lawyer regulation
through its development of model rules. These include the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the model rules for client protection
described above. But the ABA's model rules must be approved by the
600-member House of Delegates, and they often reflect compromises
to accommodate lawyers' interests.15 Once the ABA approves model
rules, each jurisdiction typically considers whether to adopt the rules
in its own state." In the case of the ABA's model rules concerning

(2011) (noting that a firm reimbursed $500,000 to ten corporate clients upon
discovery of a partner's fraudulent billing practices); Gina Passarella, Ex-DrinkerBiddle
StaffAttorney Suspendedfor Overbilling, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 28, 2015), https://w
ww.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202727597064&back=law (reporting that
Drinker Biddle refunded a corporate client for all time billed by the lawyer responsible
for overbilling); see also Christine Simmons, ChargesAgainst BarclayDamon PartnerStand
out Among Lawyer Theft Cases, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 2018, 5:58 PM), https://www.law.
com/newyorklawj ournal/2018/06/20/charges-against-barclay-damon-partner-standout-among-lawyer-theft-cases [https://perma.cc/HS4M-D3YV] (explaining that client
protection funds see fewer claims made against large firms because large firms can
reimburse clients on their own).
14. Two recent examples of the victimization of individual clients involve
prominent lawyers who allegedly stole millions from their personal injury clients. See
Holly Barker, State Bar Claims Thomas GirardiIntentionally Stolefrom Clients, BLOOMBERG
L. (Mar. 30, 2021, 9:41 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/state-barclaims-thomas-girardi-intentionally-stole-from-clients
[https://perma.cc/JN4H3LGE] (describing alleged failure to pay $2 million to families of victims of airplane
crash); Michael Finnegan, Michael Avenatti Accused at Fraud Trial of Stealingfrom Client
to Buy PrivateJet, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/califor
nia/story/2021-07-21/michael-avenatti-embezzlement-trial-opens
(describing, inter
alia, theft of $4 million from paraplegic, mentally disabled client).
15. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules ofProfessionalConduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 720-21 (1989) (describing the
American College of Trial Lawyers's successful efforts to effect changes to Model Rule
1.13, despite the ABA Corporations Section's strong interest in keeping the original
text); see also Sam Skolnik, ABA Passes Access to Justice Measure After Opposition Fades,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 17, 2020, 6:37 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/businessand-practice/aba-passes-access-to-justice-measure-after-oppositionfades?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/B3W4-R3ZT].
16. Every state but California has adopted some variation of the Model Rules for
ProfessionalConduct. See AlphabeticalList ofJurisdictionsAdopting the Model Rules, AM. BAR
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client protection, however, those rules, if adopted by jurisdictions at
all, have often been adopted with variations that insufficiently protect
clients' interests.17

One reason this has occurred is because in many jurisdictions, the
state bar organizations-and not the state supreme courts-take the
lead in lawyer regulation. Courts are busy with their main work
(deciding cases), and lawyer regulation is frequently not at the top of
their agendas. 18 The supreme courts also have many other
responsibilities including oversight of the state judicial system, budget
preparation, lobbying the legislature for appropriations, and court
reform.1 9 They often rely on bar organizations to propose ideas, study
issues, hold hearings, make recommendations, and draft language to
make changes in lawyer regulation. Not surprisingly, the input from
bar organizations tends to reflect lawyers' concerns. For various
reasons-including judges' tendency to identify with lawyers'
interests-the courts often adopt the state bars' recommendations.2 0
State bars vary in their role in lawyer regulation and their
relationships to their states' supreme courts. Nineteen states have
voluntary state bars, which lawyers can choose to join.2 1 Thirty-one
ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publication
s/modelrules_of professional conduct/alpha list state adopting model rules.
17. See, e.g., infra notes 84, 165-67 and accompanying text.
18.

See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL

SYSTEM 137 (2011).
19. See Steven W. Hays & James W. Douglas,JudicialAdministration: Modernizingthe
Third Branch, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1017 (Jack Rabin et al. eds, 3d
ed. 2007) (explaining the various responsibilities of chief justices); Steven W. Hays,
The Traditional Managers: Judges and Court Clerks, in HANDBOOK OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 221, 224 (Steven W. Hays & Cole Blease Graham,
Jr. eds., 1993) (listing the many non-judicial tasks chiefjudges are required to handle);
Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court Reform, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1535, 1543-46 (2006) (detailing how state supreme courts have been
responsible for some court reform).
20. See BARTON, supra note 18, at 1, 37 (explaining judges' tendency to
subconsciously be biased towards lawyers' interests); Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of
Lawyer Regulation: The Case of MalpracticeInsurance, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 981
(2020) (same). Of course, state bar organizations are not the only bar associations that
recommend changes in lawyer regulation to the courts, but due to their size, they are
often the most influential.
21. Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2
(2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/wp-content/uplo
ads/sites/26/2020/04/Levin_The-End-of-Mandatory-State-Bars.pdf [https://perma.c
c/X2X4-C3S8]. In some states, less than half of the lawyers with offices in the
jurisdiction belong to the voluntary state bar. Id. at 8-9.
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states and the District of Columbia have mandatory bars, to which all
lawyers in the jurisdiction must pay dues and belong. 22 Mandatory bars
are often established as state agencies or as instrumentalities of the
judiciary.23 These bars typically claim that public protection is one of
their goals and handle some regulatory functions, such as admission
or discipline.2 4 In most other respects, they perform the same functions
as voluntary state bars.25 All state bars seek to protect the legal
profession's image and to advance its members' interests. This can
sometimes be seen in the positions the state bars take with respect to
client protection issues.
This Article looks at the current state of client protection measures
in the United States and explores why many jurisdictions fail to
adequately protect individual clients (and their money). It focuses
primarily on the ABA's recommendations concerning client
protection measures because the ABA has devoted significant
attention to these issues and the states often follow the ABA's lead.
Part I of the Article describes the ABA's refusal to require in its Model
Rules ofProfessionalConduct that most fee agreements be in writing, even
though a writing requirement would reduce subsequent fee
disagreements and opportunities for lawyer overreaching. Most states
have followed the ABA's approach. Yet when the ABA adopted model
rules for additional client protection measures, states mostly declined
to implement those measures or failed to do so in ways that would truly
protect ordinary clients. As explained in Part II, even though virtually
all jurisdictions have instituted lawyer-client fee arbitration programs,
lawyer participation in most states is voluntary, notwithstanding the
ABA's recommendation that lawyers be required to participate.

22. See id. at 2. In a few of the jurisdictions with mandatory state bars, there are
also voluntary state bars. See, e.g., About NCBA, N.C. BAR Ass'N, https://www.ncbar.
org/about [https://perma.cc/436K-PPMG].
23. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 9.010 (2) (2020); History of the Bar, WASH. STATE BAR
Ass'N (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.wsba.org/about-wsba/who-we-are/history-of-thewsba [https://perma.cc/BPW9-LPFS].
24. See Levin, supra note 21, at 5-6; Mission, Vision & Core Values, STATE BAR OF
ARiz., https://www.azbar.org/about-us/mission-vision-core-values
[https://perma.
cc/ALR7-693E] ("The State Bar of Arizona exists to serve and protect the public with
respect to the provision of legal services and access to justice.").
25. These include, inter alia, efforts to educate lawyers about changes in the law,
support them in their work, and socialize them into the norms of the profession. Levin,
supra note 21, at 2-3. The exception is California, where in 2017, the legislature
separated the State Bar of California's regulatory functions from its other bar functions
and created a voluntary state bar to perform those other functions. Id. at 17-18.
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Without such a requirement, many clients have no meaningful
recourse when fee disputes arise. Part III discusses the failure by many
jurisdictions to follow the ABA's recommendation that they sufficiently
finance their client protection funds so that they can fully compensate
individuals who have been victimized by overreaching lawyers. At the
same time, most states have refused to adopt other ABA-recommended
client protection measures that would help deter lawyer theft,
including insurance payee notification and random trust account
audits. Part IV considers why many jurisdictions have not adopted
adequate client protection measures. As noted, the answer is
sometimes due, in part, to resistance by the state bars and acquiescence
(or inattention) by the state courts. Somewhat surprisingly,
notwithstanding mandatory state bars' claimed commitment to public
protection, several jurisdictions with mandatory bars have adopted
fewer client protection measures than jurisdictions with voluntary state
bars. The Conclusion discusses the need for closer study to better
understand why many jurisdictions fail to adopt adequate client
protection measures. It also suggests that the states' highest courts
need to become more involved in evaluating and strengthening the
states' client protection measures. If courts are unable or unwilling to
take needed action, state legislatures can and should step in to do so.
I.

THE BAR'S RESISTANCE TO WRITTEN FEE AGREEMENT
REQUIREMENTS

The disputes that can arise when there is no written fee agreement
sometimes reveal profound disagreements between clients and their
lawyers. Yet even by 1969, when the ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Disciplinary Rules did not mention
written fee agreements.26 It did, however, state in an Ethical
Consideration that "[i]t is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the
understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is
contingent."27 The singling out of contingent fees may have been due
to concerns about potential client confusion relating to the calculation
of contingent fees. But it seemingly also reflected the organized bar's
long-standing disdain for contingent fees and for lawyers who worked
on that basis. 28

26.

See MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 2-106 (AM. BARASS'N 1969).

27. Id. at EC 2-19.
28.

The elite bar associated contingent fees with ethnic lawyers, unprofessional

conduct, and "ambulance chasers." See, e.g., JEROLD

AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
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.

In the early 1980s, when the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, chaired by Robert Kutak ("the Kutak
Commission"), drafted new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, its
proposed Model Rule 1.5 required written fee agreements when the
lawyer had not regularly represented the client.29 The Kutak
Commission noted "universal acknowledgement" that written fee
agreements were a good practice and that fee disputes were a "major
problem" in lawyer-client relations that written agreements could help
address. 30 Nevertheless, at the ABA's 1982 Annual Meeting of its House
of Delegates, the State Bar of Michigan proposed an amendment to
make written agreements a "preference," with proponents of the
amendment voicing "concern that imposing a writing requirement
would result in disciplinary action against a lawyer who failed to have a
written agreement."" Proponents of the amendment also noted that a
written fee agreement "would not always be needed or desirable, and,
also, that requiring a writing departed significantly from current
practice."32 Consequently, Model Rule 1.5(b), as adopted, requires that
"[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee . .
shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing . . . except
when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same
basis or rate."3" Model Rule 1.5(c) provided, however, that contingent
fee arrangements must be in writing.34
In 2001, the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, which was tasked with
reviewing the Model Rulesfor ProfessionalConduct, 5 again recommended
a written fee agreement requirement "except when the lawyer will
44-46 (1976) (describing class and
ethnic biases associated with contingent fees); see also MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA

PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR

ASSOCIATION 246 (1988) (describing how the legal elite focused their reform efforts
on nonelite lawyering practices, such as contingent fees).
29.

AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at 78 (2006)
[hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
30.

See AM. BARASS'N COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PRO. STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE

HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7 (1982).
31.

A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

32.

Id.

supra note 29,

at 79.

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (AM. BARASS'N 1983).
34. Id. at r. 1.5(c).
35. The Ethics 2000 Commission was formed in 1997 and submitted its report to
the House of Delegates at the August 2001 Annual Meeting. Ethics 2000 Commission,
AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/
policy/ethics_2000_commission [https://perma.cc/JR5C-VQ3X].
33.
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charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate" or
when the total cost to the client would be $500 or less.36 It also
recommended language stating that "[a] ny changes in the basis or rate
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in writing." 7 The
Ethics 2000 Commission explained that "[flew issues between lawyer
and client produce more misunderstandings and disputes than the fee
due the lawyer."3" It further noted that "[t] he Commission believes that
the time has come to minimize misunderstandings by requiring the
notice to be in writing. ..

."39 Nevertheless, the Ethics 2000 proposal

met resistance in the ABA House of Delegates, which voted to restore
the "preferably in writing" language to the amended Model Rule 1.5 it
adopted in 2002.40
In some respects, this bar opposition is surprising. Written fee
agreements benefit both clients and lawyers because they help confirm
that there is mutual understanding about fees and thereby reduce
disputes between the parties. Indeed, bar journals routinely advise
lawyers to use written fee agreements.4 1 Lawyer malpractice insurers
typically ask lawyers in their insurance applications whether they use
written fee agreements.4 2 So why did the ABA House of Delegates twice
oppose a requirement that fee agreements be in writing? One possible
explanation is that no one, including lawyers, likes to be told what they
must do. But this is not entirely convincing, because the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct impose other affirmative obligations on lawyers

36. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 88.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 91.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 93. House of Delegates member John Bouma, a prominent Arizona
attorney and former president of the State Bar of Arizona, proposed to delete the
writing requirement, and the House of Delegates adopted that amendment. Id.
41. See, e.g.,Jill S. Chanen, It's NotJustAbout Money: KeepingFee Disputes to a Minimum
Can Be Key to Reducing Risks of Malpractice Claims and Disciplinary Complaints, A.B.A.

J.,

May 2004, at 44, 47; Dawn M. Evans, Practice Tips for Solo and Small-Firm Lawyers, 88
MICH. B. J. 56, 57-58 (2009); Coyt R. Johnston & Robert L. Tobey, The "Best of'
Litigation Update 2020: Chapter 11: Legal Malpractice, 50 ADvoc. 8 (2010); Edward Poll,
Fee "Write-Down" Could save You Headaches-and Dollars, MASS. LAws. WKLY. (Oct. 3,

2012), https://masslawyersweekly.com/2012/10/03/fee-write-down-could-save-youheadaches-and-dollars.
42. See Leslie C. Levin, Regulators at the Margins: The Impact of MalpracticeInsurers on
Solo and Small FirmLawyers, 49 CONN. L. REv. 553, 569-70 (2016).
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when they deal with client money. 43 The more likely answer is the one
offered by the State Bar of Michigan: lawyers were concerned that a
writing requirement would expose them to disciplinary sanctions if
they forget to use one.44
Notwithstanding the ABA's rejection of a requirement in Model
Rule 1.5 that most fee agreements be in writing, fourteen jurisdictions
now impose that requirement. 5 Several of them follow the Ethics 2000
Commission's recommendation and only impose a writing
requirement when the fee exceeds a low dollar amount." State bar
associations in some of these jurisdictions actively opposed efforts to
impose these writing requirements.47

43. One such obligation concerns the requirement to place client money in a trust
account, including advance fees. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.15(a), (c)
(AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Stephen Gillers suggests a third
possible explanation, which is that a lack of clarity about fees may benefit lawyers,
especially with individual clients who are unlikely to have the resources to go to court
and fight over fees. See Gillers, supra note 6, at 403-04. It seems unlikely, however, that
the House of Delegates members were quite so calculating.
45. These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. AM. BAR Ass'N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.5: FEES

1-16, 24-26, 29-30, 32-35, 40-

41, 50-52 (2021) [hereinafter VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT RULE 1.5: FEES], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional-responsibility/mrpc-1-5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6J5RAKDE]; CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 2021).
46. The thresholds range from $250 to $3,000. See, e.g., HAw. RULES OF PRO. RESP. r.
1.5 (b) ($250); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1215.2 (a) ($3,000); VARIATIONS OF
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.5: FEES, supra note 45, at 3, 14,

24, 30, 51.
47. For example, in 1983, a New Jersey Supreme Court appointed task force
recommended that New Jersey follow the Kutak Commission's earlier draft of the
Model Rules, requiring that fee agreements be in writing. Report of the New Jersey Supreme
Court Committee on the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, N.J. L.J.,July 28, 1983, at 1. The
voluntary NewJersey State Bar Association subsequently argued (unsuccessfully) to the
supreme court that the court should adopt the ABA's Model Rule 1.5(b) with its
"preferably in writing" language, claiming that a writing requirement "would impose
onerous burdens on lawyers." Letter from NewJersey State Bar Ass'n to the NewJersey
Sup. Ct. 4 (Nov. 29, 1983) (on file with author). Likewise, when the Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted a broad written fee agreement requirement, it was
propounded by Daniel W. Hildebrand, who served as Wisconsin's Ethics 2000
Committee chair, but opposed by the State Bar of Wisconsin. See David Ziemer,
Wisconsin Supreme Court Tentatively Mandates Written Fee Agreements, Wis. LJ., Mar. 8,
2006; Daniel W. Hildebrand, Ethics 2000: UnderstandingProposed Changes to Professional
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More than thirty-five jurisdictions follow Model Rule 1.5(b) and do
not require written fee agreements for most fee arrangements. 48 A
substantial minority of lawyers in some of these states do not use
written agreements. Surveys of lawyers in Iowa and Oklahoma
indicated that at least seventeen percent did not routinely put their fee
agreements in writing.49 When fee arrangements are not reduced to
writing, individual clients are at a disadvantage. It is harder for clients
to secure the return of unearned fees and it is easier for lawyers to try
overcharge their clients.50 When fee disputes arise, individual clients
have limited options.
II.

THE LIMITS OF FEE DISPUTE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS

Fee disputes between lawyers and clients are not uncommon.5 1 They
occur for many reasons including misunderstandings about how the
Conduct Rules, Wis. LAw. (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/
wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=77&Issue=1 1&ArticleID=668
[https://perma.cc/WN23-E8MA]; see also Dubin, supra note 6, at 99 (describing
opposition to a writing requirement by the State Bar of Michigan and its members).
In Hawaii, however, the mandatory Hawaii State Bar Association took no position on
the issue. See E-mail from Iris M. Ito, Assistant Exec. Dir., Hawaii State Bar Ass'n, to
Adam Mackie, Reference Libr., Univ. of Connecticut L. Libr. (May 10, 2021, 10:09
EDT) (on file with author).
48.

VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.5:

FEES, supra note 45.
49.

See, e.g., IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, 2015 SALARY & ECONOMIC SURVEY 70-71 (2015),

https://cdn.ymaws. com/www.iowabar.org/resource/resmgr/reports/2015_
economicsurvey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9X9-M7XC];
OKLA.
BAR
ASS'N,
MEMBERSHIP SURVEY 12 (2013), http://docplayer.net/10571183-Oklahoma-barassociation.html.
50. For some examples of lawyer overreaching where there was no written fee
agreement, see Iowa Sup. Ct. Atty. Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d 659, 667-68
(Iowa 2017) (demanding an additional $10,000 from her client three days before

trial); Joy v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 614 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Ky. 2021) (attempting to charge
unreasonable hourly fee after being discharged); In reDelorme, 795 N.W.2d 293, 29394 (N.D. 2011) (per curiam) (orally agreeing to rate of $125 per hour but later
charging $175 per hour and $210 per hour); Okla. BarAss'n v. Burton, 482 P.3d 739,
752-53 (Okla. 2021) (overbilling client for work at an unreasonable hourly rate and
refusing to refund money owed); McDonnell DyerP.L. C. v. Select-0-Hits, Inc., No. W200000044-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 400386, *1, *7 (Ct. App. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2001) (charging
$120,000 when reasonable fees for the work performed was roughly half that amount).
51. It is hard to determine precisely how often fee disputes arise. See Alan S. Rau,
Resolving Disputes over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REv. 2005, 2005-06
(1993). Disciplinary authorities report that they are called upon by clients to become
involved in fee disputes "frequently." See, e.g., Christina Pazzanese, SJC to Consider
MandatoryFee Arbitration,MASS. LAwS. WKLY. (Feb. 17, 2011), https://masslawyersweek
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lawyer's fees and expenses would be calculated or what the work would
ultimately cost, a failure to return unearned fees, other lawyer
overreaching, and client unhappiness with the results.52 When fee
disagreements arise, lawyers will sometimes "eat" their fees, 53 clients
will sometimes pay (unhappily), or the parties may reach a
compromise. When informal dispute resolution does not occur,
lawyers may use collection agencies,54 clients may file a discipline
complaint, or a lawsuit may ensue. Fee arbitration is often a better
alternative for both parties for the reasons described below.
A.

A BriefHistory ofFee DisputeArbitration

The legal profession has long counseled lawyers against suing clients
for fees. 55 These lawsuits make both the lawyer and the profession look
bad. The ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics urged that
"[c] ontroversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided"
and that lawsuits against clients "should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice, imposition or fraud." 56 The 1969 ABA Model Rules of Professional

ly.com/2011/02/17/sjc-to-consider-mandatory-fee-arbitration. One survey of Texas
lawyers revealed that thirty-one percent reported they had five or more fee disputes
over the preceding five years. See Rau, supra, at 2007.
52. For some additional reasons why fee disputes can occur, see Rau, supra note

50, at 2005-06.
53. Surveys of lawyers in eightjurisdictions in 2005-2006 revealed that a significant
percentage of lawyers reported that about nine to ten percent of their billed fees are
uncollectible. See Paul F. Teich, Are Lawyers Truly Greedy? An Analysis of Relevant
Empirical Evidence, 19 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 837, 882-84 (2013); see also OKLA. BAR
ASS'N, supra note 49, at 17 (reporting that more than thirty-eight percent of surveyed
Oklahoma lawyers replied that their firm failed to collect ten percent or more of their
fees); Olabisis O. Whitney & Rick DeBruhl, Attorney Survey: Arizona Lawyers Report on
Economics of Practice, ARiz. ATT'Y, Sept. 2016, at 22 (reporting that thirty percent of
lawyers surveyed failed to collect ten percent or more of their fees); STATE BAR OF
MICH., ECONOMICS OF LAw PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN 21 (2020), https://www.michbar.

org/file/pmrc/articles/0000156.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD59-AKYN] (reporting that
almost twenty-four percent of responding lawyers indicated that ten percent of more
of their fees were uncollectible).
54. See IOwA STATE BAR ASS'N, supranote 49, at 79; see also Teich, supra note 53, at

880-81.
55.

In 1860, George Sharswood recommended against suing clients for fees except

in extraordinary

circumstances.

GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS 95 (2d ed. 1860); see also Teich, supranote 53, at 885.

56.
(1908).

See COMM. ON CODE OF PROF. ETHICS, AM. BARASS'N CANONS OF PRO. ETHICS 14
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Responsibility echoed this view. 7 The conventional wisdom among lawyers
also holds that lawsuits for fees will provoke clients to counterclaim for
malpractice or file a disciplinary complaint in response.58
In the late 1920s, the organized bar began to institute voluntary fee
arbitration programs.59 One important reason was to avoid "the public
airing of fee disputes." 60 By the 1960s, several local bar associations
offered voluntary fee dispute resolution to lawyers and clients.61 One
commentator observed at that time that the profession would benefit
from arbitration because it "would provide a fair and equitable
resolution of the dispute" without publicity, the attorney would benefit
"because those best qualified to evaluate his services would pass upon
his charges," and the client would benefit from being afforded a
speedy, cost-free remedy.6 2 The outcomes of fee dispute resolution
during this period generally favored lawyers. 63
Throughout this time, disciplinary authorities viewed most attorneyclient fee disputes as being outside their jurisdiction.6 4 In 1970, when
the ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement issued its report, it noted that the failure to address these
disputes affected the public's perception of the bar and recommended
procedures to deal with ordinary fee disputes (i.e., those that did not
involve "overreaching").65 It suggested that procedures for arbitrating
fee disputes be handled outside the bar associations to avoid the

57. See MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 2-23 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1969) (stating that "[a]
lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients
and ...
should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross
imposition by the client").
58. See, e.g., Stephen M. Blumberg, Risk Management: PreventingMalpractice Claims,
LAw PRAc., Sept. 1987, at 54; Emily Eichenhorn, To Sue or Not to Sue: Is the Pursuit of
Unpaid Fees Worth the Risk of Litigation?, 66 OR. STATE BAR BULL. 29 (2006); Glenn
Machado, Money Matters: Make Sure You're Handling Your Clients'Dollars with Sense, NEv.

Law., Oct. 2014, at 20.
59. In 1928, the Los Angeles County Bar Association became the first bar
association to establish a Committee on Arbitration. George E. Bodle, The Arbitration
of Fee Disputes Between Attorney and Clients, 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 265, 265 (1963).
60. Id.
61.

See

PROBLEMS

AM.
AND

BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF'T,
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 189 (1970)

[hereinafter SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF'T].

62.
63.

Bodle, supranote 59, at 265.
Id.

64.

SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF'T,

188.
65.

See id. at 1, 186, 188-89.

supra note 61, at

186,
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conclusion that "a group of attorneys is protecting one of its own."66 In
1974, another ABA committee issued a report devoted to fee dispute
resolution and noted the increasing problem that lawyers would not
voluntarily participate in the fee arbitration process, but the
committee did not recommend that lawyers be required to do so. 6 7
Nevertheless, that same year, Alaska became the first state to adopt
a statewide fee arbitration program in which lawyers-but not clientswere required to participate ("mandatory fee arbitration").68 A few
other states subsequently adopted statewide voluntary or mandatory
fee arbitration programs.69 The 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct encouraged lawyers to participate in fee dispute resolution
even when it was not mandatory.7 0 In 1992, the ABA's Commission on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement ("the McKay Commission"),
which had been formed to review state lawyer discipline enforcement
throughout the country, recommended fee arbitration as one of the
procedures that could be used in lieu of discipline for minor
misconduct.7 1
In 1995, the ABA adopted Model Rules forFee Arbitrationbased on the
experience in six states that had instituted mandatory fee arbitration.72
These model rules provide that the state's highest court shall appoint
a Fee Arbitration Commission to administer the program and that one-

66. Id. at 189.
67. Rau, supra note 51, at 2021. It also predicted that "there was little likelihood"
that mandatory arbitration would gain support. Id.
68. See OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF THE SUP. CT. OF N.J., 2019 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM REPORT 43 (2020), https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/
2019oaeannualrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWX2-HV5A]; AM. BARASS'N CTR. FOR PRO.
RESP., 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART 11-PART 1 (2007)
[hereinafter 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS

CHART

Il-PART

1],

https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/clientpro_mi
grated/Fee_Arb_Chart_2_Partj.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ6Y-TXB4].
69. For example, Oregon began its voluntary fee arbitration program in 1976 and
Maine and NewJersey adopted mandatory programs in 1978. See 2006 ABA SURVEY OF
FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART II-PART 1, supranote 68.
70. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 9 (AM. BARASS'N 1983) (stating
that if a voluntary fee arbitration or mediation procedure has been established for fee
disputes "the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it").
71.

LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, RECOMMENDATION 1,
72.

See MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARB. Preface

(AM.

48

(1992).

BAR ASS'N 1995); A History of the

Client Protection Rules, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional-responsibility/resources/clientprotection/history.
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third of the commissioners shall be nonlawyers. 7' They further state

that fee arbitration should be mandatory for lawyers if arbitration is
commenced by the client.74 Lawyers are required to notify the client of
the availability of the fee arbitration program before or at the time that
the lawyer commences litigation to recover fees.7 If the client seeks fee
arbitration within thirty days, the litigation will be stayed.76 The rules
also provide that disputes exceeding $7,500 are to be decided by three
panel arbitrators, including one nonlawyer.7 7 Where the disputed
amount is lower, the Model Rules for Fee Arbitration provide that there
should be a single lawyer arbitrator. 78 Fee arbitration is confidential
and is binding for all parties if they have agreed in writing to be bound
by it.79 Even if a party (usually the lawyer) has not agreed to be bound,
the party will be bound if a trial de novo is not sought within thirty days
after the decision is served. 80 Participation in fee arbitration does not
preclude the client from filing a disciplinary complaint. 81
B.

CurrentFee ArbitrationPrograms

Although there are fee arbitration programs in virtually every
jurisdiction, 82 not all jurisdictions have statewide programs. Contrary
to the ABA's recommendation in its Model RulesforFee Arbitration, most
of these programs are administered by bar associations. 83 Only ten

73.

MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARB. r. 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1995).

Id. at r. 1(3).
75. Id. at r. 1 cmt.
76. Id. at r. 1(7).
77. Id. at r. 3(2).
74.

78.

Id.

79. Id. at r. 1(4),8(1).
80.
81.
82.

Id. at r. 1(4).
Id. at r. 1 cmt.
Arkansas and North Carolina are the exceptions. See AM. BARAss'N, 2016 ABA

SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS (2016) [hereinafter 2016 ABA SURVEY OF FEE

ARBITRATION PROGRAMS], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/professional-responsibility/feearbitrationsurvey_2016.xlsx.
83. It appears that only Maine and a few other jurisdictions have fee arbitration
programs that are entirely independent of their states' bar organizations. See, e.g., ME.
BAR r. 7. Along with Maine, both Michigan and NewJersey house their fee arbitration
programs within their disciplinary systems. See id.; MICH. CT. r. 9.130(A); Office of
Attorney Ethics, N.J. CTS., https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/oae.html [https://perma.cc/
S5T-R576]. In some areas of New York, the program is handled by voluntary bar
associations, and in others it is administered by the Administrative Judge's Office. See
N.Y. STATE ATT'Y-CLIENT FEE DISP. RESOL. PROGRAM, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS 12-13 [hereinafter N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
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jurisdictions make arbitration mandatory for lawyers if the client seeks
it.84 In those jurisdictions, the requirement was imposed by statute or
court rule. 85 Georgia does not make fee arbitration mandatory, but it
places pressure on lawyers to arbitrate fee disputes by providing that if
the lawyer refuses to arbitrate, the arbitration can still go forward, and
"the award rendered will be considered as prima facie evidence of the
fairness of the award in any action brought to enforce the award." 6
Clients can be compelled to submit to fee arbitration in some
jurisdictions if their lawyers included a fee arbitration clause with
adequate disclosure in their engagement agreements. 87

TO

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

BOARD

OF

THE

COURTS],

https://www.nycourts.gov/

legacyPDFs/admin/feedispute/Annual-Report-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FHFEX9].
84. The jurisdictions are Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Maine, Montana,
NewJersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See AM. BAR ASs'N, supra
note 5. In addition, North Carolina requires lawyers to participate in mediation, but if
no agreement can be reached, the client must go to court. See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 1D.0707-08 (2020); Harry B. Warren, New Fee Dispute Resolution Rules: Good-Bye
NonbindingArbitration, N.C. STATE BARJ., Fall 2000, at 28, 29.
85.

See 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART II-PART 1,

supra

note 68; 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 137.0 (2021).
86. The burden of proof shifts to the lawyer to prove otherwise. See GA. BAR r. 6410, 6-417. Nevada makes arbitration mandatory for a lawyer if, during the preceding
two years, the attorney has been the subject of three or more fee disputes within the
Committee's

jurisdiction.

STATE BAR OF NEv. DISP. ARB. COMM. RULES OF PROC.

(IV) (B)(2), https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/Fee-Dispute-Rules-of-Proce
dureNov-8-2017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB74-UL7W].

87. See, e.g., Ober v. Mozingo, No. D038616, 2002 WL 432544, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2002) (stating that, generally, an attorney can include mandatory
arbitration clauses regarding fee disputes in initial retainer agreements); Johnson,
Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 67 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that arbitration agreement in engagement agreement was not
unconscionable or a violation of public policy); Innovative Images, LLC v.

Summerville, 848 S.E.2d 75, 79-81 (Ga. 2020) (holding that the inclusion of the
mandatory arbitration clause in engagement agreement did not rise to the level of
unconscionability or significantly contravene public policy and was enforceable);
Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069, 1077-78 (La. 2012) (stating that mandatory
arbitration agreement regarding fee disputes are proper under Louisiana law,
although a failure to make the proper disclosures around the waiver of rights could be
grounds for voiding the agreement). In 2002, the ABA issued a Formal Opinion that
concluded it was permissible to include in a retainer agreement a provision requiring
a client to submit to binding arbitration of fee disputes but stated that the lawyer must
explain the implications of binding arbitration to the extent necessary for the client to
make an "informed decision" before signing the agreement. See ABA Comm. on Ethics

& Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 02-425 (2002).
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Some jurisdictions require that the fee disputes exceed a minimum
dollar amount to qualify for resolution through their fee arbitration
programs. 88 As recommended by the ABA, most jurisdictions' fee
arbitration programs provide for two lawyer arbitrators and one
nonlawyer arbitrator to decide larger disputes. 89 The arbitration
process is free or offered at a low cost to both parties.90 Several
jurisdictions also offer mediation of fee disputes.9 1
Why would a jurisdiction not require mandatory fee arbitration?
After all, fee arbitration has advantages for both lawyers and clients
because it is faster, cheaper, and more private than litigation.9 2 One
answer appears to be that many bar organizations oppose it. 93 Some

88. See, e.g., FeeArbitrationProgram,STATE BAR OF N.M., https://www.sbnm.org/ForPublic/I-Have-a-Dispute-with-My-Lawyer/Dispute-a-Lawyers-Fee
[https://perma.cc/AW6G-BF9P] (establishing a $1,000 minimum in dispute for
arbitration).
89. The Los Angeles Country Bar Association is on the high end and will only
provide three arbitrators if the dispute exceeds $25,000. Mandatory Fee Arbitration
Approved Programs, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/AttorneyRegulation/Mandatory-Fee-Arbitration/Approved-Programs
[https://perma.cc/D5E-Z3WE]. In most jurisdictions, the threshold amount for
three arbitrators is substantially lower.
90. See, e.g., Fee Dispute Resolution Program, VA. STATE BAR, https://www.vsb.org/
site/public/fee-dispute-resolution-program [https://perma.cc/54LV-CTVG] (stating
that petitioner pays a one-time $20 fee, and the other party pays no administrative
fees).
91. See, e.g., Attorney Fee Disputes, ALASKA BAR ASS'N, https://alaskabar.org/for-thepublic/attorney-fee-disputes [https://perma.cc/YK4S-QGXS]; ATT'Y/CLIENT ARB.
BD.,

D.C. BAR, FEE ARBITRATION SERVICE RULES OF PROCEDURE 5 (2018),
https://www.dcbar.org/getmedia/3ee82b36-fcca-4690-b734-7e510871e6cd/ACAB-

Fee-Arbitration-Filing-Packet [https://perma.cc/7466-PZYA]; Fee Dispute Resolution
Program,
OR.
STATE
BAR,
https://www.osbar.org/feedisputeresolution
[https://perma.cc/SN3R-RVCY].
92. SeeJohn Leubsdorf, Against Lawyer Retaining Liens, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 849,
873 (2004). For discussion of some additional disadvantages of litigation, see Rau,
supra note 51, at 2016-18.

93. See, e.g., In reLiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1272-73 (NJ. 1981) (rejecting NewJersey
Bar Association's argument that mandatory fee arbitration was unconstitutional);
Marilyn Lindgren Cohen, Mandatory Fee Arbitration: Is It the Wave of the Future?, OR.
STATE BAR BULL., Dec. 1994, at 33, 35 (describing reasons why Oregon State Bar Board
of Governors did not support mandatory arbitration for lawyers); Dara McLeod,
Virginia State BarPanel Rejects Mandatory Fee Dispute Resolution, VA. LAwS. WKLY., Dec. 6,
2004 (describing state bar task force's rejection of mandatory mediation); Pazzanese,
supra note 51 (describing opposition to mandatory arbitration by Massachusetts bar
organizations); Gary Spencer, MatrimonialRules Delayed for Changes; PresidingJustices to
Weigh Criticisms, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 1993, at 8 (describing "uniform opposition among
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lawyers believe that low-cost or free fee dispute arbitration programs
make it too easy for clients to dispute their fees and to delay or avoid
payment.9 4 They argue that mandatory arbitration would cause lawyers
to require most of their fees up front, resulting in fewer clients who
could retain lawyers, or that it would force lawyers to write off more of
their fees. 5 Lawyers have claimed-less persuasively-that they do not
want to be deprived of ajury trial.96 Lawyers also argue that mandatory
fee arbitration would "creat[e] more reasons to be disciplined"
because arbitrators would be considering the reasonableness of fees
under the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. 7
Washington's experience illustrates how lawyers can thwart efforts to
adopt mandatory fee arbitration programs. The mandatory
Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) first adopted a voluntary fee
arbitration program in the mid-1970s. 98 In 1995, the WSBA and a
Washington Supreme Court Task Force on Lawyer Discipline
produced a joint report with recommendations including that
Washington institute a mandatory fee arbitration program.9 9
Regulators reported that "55% of the time the lawyer decline [d] to
arbitrate fee disputes, leaving [clients] frustrated."100 In 1996, the
WSBA's Board of Governors approved, in concept, a proposal to
implement such a fee program. 10 1 A WSBA committee then developed
draft rules to implement the new program and the Washington State Bar
News reported these developments in August 1997. The Board of

bar groups" to proposed mandatory fee arbitration program in New York); David
Ziemer, WI Supreme Court Addresses Ethics, Fee Arbitration, Wis. L.J., Dec. 25, 2002
(describing "strong opposition amongst the bar" to mandatory fee arbitration).
94. See, e.g., Stephen T. Carmick, Letter to the Editor, WASH. STATE BAR NEws,July
1998, at 8, 9; Steven A. Hemmat, Letter to Editor, WASH. STATE BAR NEws,July 1998, at
7, 8; Terry Lee, It Ain't Broke, so What Are We Fixing? An Argument Against MandatoryFee
Arbitration, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, May 1998, at 25.
95. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 94, at 25; Hemmat, supra note 94, at 7-8.
96. See, e.g., In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d at 1273. It is unclear why a lawyer would prefer
that a fee dispute be decided by ajury rather than a panel composed primarily of peers.
97. Lee, supranote 94, at 25.
98. The Board's Work, WASH. STATE BAR NEwS, Aug-Sept. 1974, at 14.
99. Lindsay T. Thompson, Refining Lawyer Discipline in Washington: A Multifaceted
Approach, WASH. STATE BAR NEwS, Aug. 1995, at 15, 17, 19.
100. See Barbara Harper & Randy Beitel, FeeArbitrationto Be Mandatory when Requested
by a Client, WASH. STATE BAR NEwS, Aug. 1997, at 37.
101. Barrie Althoff & Randy Beitel, Governors Restructure Attorney Discipline, WASH.
STATE BAR NEwS, Apr. 1996, at 35, 36; M. Wayne Blair & Marijean E. Moschetto, Fee
Arbitration:An Updateon Revisions to the Proposaland an Argument in Support, WASH. STATE
BAR NEWS, May 1998, at 24, 24.
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Governors anticipated taking final action the following month but
invited interested parties to share their views with the WSBA. 1 2 At the
Board of Governors's September meeting, they faced a "firestorm,"
with lawyers complaining that the proposed rule was being "loaded in
favor of consumers."103 The Board of Governors decided to table
discussion so that more WSBA members could weigh in.1 4' The lawyers'
responses that followed were largely negative. 10 5 Even after many
revisions of the proposed rule, there was "overwhelming negative
reaction from [WSBA] members."0 6 In June 1998, the Board of
Governors voted to "put a stake through the heart" of the proposal and
to cease to consider mandatory fee arbitration. 10 7
The voluntary fee arbitration programs that are found in most
jurisdictions today vary in certain notable respects. Some jurisdictions
have statewide fee arbitration programs established by court rule and
administered by the state bar. 108 In other jurisdictions these programs
were established and are entirely run by the state bar. 10 9 Some states
with large lawyer populations, such as Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas,
have no statewide programs, and voluntary fee dispute resolution
programs are only offered through local bar associations." A few

102.
103.

Harper & Beitel, supranote 100, at 39.

Annual Meeting and September 11-12 Board of GovernorsMeeting, WASH. STATE BAR
Oct. 1997, at 40. One governor stated that the rule was "too volatile in its current
form." Id.
104. Id.
105. See Letters to the Editor, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Oct. 1997, at 8, 9-11; The
Board's Work, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Nov. 1997, at 31.
106. Mary Fairhurst, President'sReport, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Sept. 1998, at 13.
107. Id.; see also Sherrie Bennett, The Board's Work, WASH. STATE BAR NEwS,July 1998,
at 33 (asserting that the Board had voted to "permanently cease" considering
mandatory fee arbitration as a result of the increasing number of antiarbitration
resolutions).
108. Kentucky, Nevada, and Utah are examples. See, e.g., 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE
ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART II-PART I, supranote 68.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., How to Submit a Request for Investigation, ATT'Y REGISTRATION
DISCIPLINARY COMM'N OF SUP. CT. OF ILL., https://web.archive.org/web/201812281529
00/http://www.iardc.org/htr-otherinfoprov.html; FAQs - Public, PA. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.pabar.org/site/For-the-Public/FAQs-and-Legal-Links/FAQ
[https://perma.cc/6S7M-W5LR]; Resolving Fee Disagreements, STATE BAR OF TEX.,
https://www.texasbar.com/
Content/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/ResolvingFeeDis
agreements/default.htm [https://perma.cc/8VE2-VMP4].

&
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programs do not use nonlawyer arbitrators or use only a single lawyerarbitrator, even for higher value fee disputes."
How easy is it for clients to learn about the availability of fee
arbitration when a fee dispute arises? It really depends. New York
requires lawyers to advise clients of the availability of fee arbitration in
writing when a fee dispute cannot otherwise be resolved." 2 Some other
jurisdictions do a good job of informing the public about the
availability of fee arbitration in places where clients are likely to look,
such as lawyer disciplinary agency and state bar websites.113 But in other
jurisdictions, it is more difficult for clients to learn about fee
arbitration programs. The Mississippi Bar's website, for example, does
not provide the public with information about how to contact its
Dispute Resolution Committee.14 Even after searching the North
Dakota State Bar Association's website, I was unable to determine that
North Dakota had a fee dispute resolution program without writing to
the state bar to confirm that it had one. The District of Columbia's
Attorney/Client Arbitration Board reports that "public awareness
about the program" is its biggest challenge.1 15
It can be even more challenging to learn about the work of most fee
arbitration programs. (The term "black hole" comes to mind.) The
ABA Committee on Client Protection periodically surveys states to

111. States that exclusively use lawyer-arbitrators include Colorado, Mississippi,
Oregon, and Rhode Island. See 2016 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS, supra
note 82; 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS, CHART V-PART 1 (2007),
https://www.americanbar. org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respo
nsibility/clientpro_migrated/Fee_Arb_Chart_5_Part_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF7B-

D9QD].
112. See 22 N.Y.

COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 137.6(a) (1) (2021).
113. See, e.g., FAQ/Fee Arbitration, STATE BAR OF GA., https://www.gabar.org/about
thebar/faq/fas.cfm?filter=Fee%20Arbitration
[https://perma.cc/9MX3-7AZW];
Lawyer Fee Dispute Resolution, LA. STATE BAR Ass'N, https://www.lsba.org/Public/Fee
DisputeResolution.aspx [https://perma.cc/F248-VZUB]. A few of the websites
provide helpful brochures that explain the process. See, e.g., VA. STATE BAR, FEE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROGRAM (2020), https://www.vsb.org/docs/fee-dispute-brochure.pdf

[https://perma.cc/72K6-W5V2].
114. The website refers the reader to the Committee rules, but those rules do not
explain how to contact the Committee. See The Program, MIss. BAR, https://www.msbar
.org/ethics-discipline/fee-disputes/the-program [https://perma.cc/FK7E-NDBE]. In
addition, the Mississippi Bar's Frequently Asked Questions about problems with an
attorney make no reference to fee disputes. See Frequently Asked Questions, MIss. BAR,
https://www.msbar.org/ethics-discipline/disciplinary-process/frequently-askedquestions [https://perma.cc/NU2P-U9JS].
115. 2016 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS, supranote 82.
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obtain information about their programs, but its most recent survey
only yielded responses from ten jurisdictions and one local bar
association."' Some information about fee arbitration programs can
be gleaned if jurisdictions publish annual reports,11 7 but most
jurisdictions do not do so.
The limited data reveal substantial differences in the extent to which
fee arbitration is utilized. Comparisons are difficult because the
jurisdictions report their data differently, but Georgia's program
appears to be the most active, with approximately ninety-eight new
disputes reported every month during the period 2019 to 2020 and
about twenty-five hearings scheduled monthly.118 New Jersey received
796 matters in 2019119 while New York closed 770 matters.12 0 Yet only
forty-five fee arbitration disputes were filed in the District of Columbia
in 2019, which was similar to the number of filings received in Maine.I2
While the Los Angeles County Bar Association's mandatory fee
116. Id. One of the ten reporting jurisdictions was Arkansas, which had no fee
dispute resolution program.
117. While a few jurisdictions provide detailed information about their arbitration
programs, most only indicate the number of matters filed or disposed of during the year.
See, e.g., ALASKA BAR ASS'N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter ALASKA 2018 ANNUAL

REPORT], https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-annual-report-1.pdf

perma.cc/682Z-JNGH];

ATT'Y/CLIENT ARB. BD. OF THE D.C. BAR,

[https://

2019-20 ANNUAL

REPORT

[hereinafter D.C. 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT]; STATE BAR OF GA., BOG BOARD BOOic 2020
ANNUAL MEETING 84-87 (2020) [hereinafter GA. BOG BOARD BOOK], https://www.gabar.o
rg/committeesprogramssections/boardofgovemors/upload/AM20_Boardbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24EJ-3WFC]; ME. BD. OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 5
[hereinafter ME. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.mebaroverseers.org/about/pdf/
2018%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U5-AZKX]; STATE BAR OF NEV.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2020 [hereinafter NEv. ANNUAL REPORT 2020], https://www.
nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/SBN-2020-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU9DK99X]; N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS,

supra note

83, at 15-16, 18-19; OFF. OF ATT'YETHICS OF THE SUP. CT. OF N.J., supranote 68, at 46. When
contacted directly, some fee arbitration programs also provided annual statistics.
118. GA. BOG BOARD BOOK, supra note 117, at 85.
119. OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra note 68, at 46. The description
in this paragraph focuses on the period 2019 or 2019 to 2020, depending on how the
jurisdiction reported data, because the number of disputes and dispositions in 2020 to

2021 were likely affected by COVID-19.
120.

N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS,

supra

note 83, at 4. The fact that New York, with a larger lawyer population than NewJersey,
has roughly the same number of cases may be explained, in part, by the fact that New
York excludes criminal matters from its mandatory fee arbitration program. See 22 N.Y.
COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 137.1(b) (2) (2021).
121. D.C. 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 4; ALASKA 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT, supranote 117.
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arbitration program receives 200 to 300 fee arbitration requests each
year, the Chicago Bar Association's voluntary program received sixtyseven fee complaints in 2019.122 Family and criminal matters generate
the most fee arbitration requests. 123 Real estate/landlord-tenant and
litigation matters also account for a significant number of the
requests. 124
The disputes in mandatory arbitration jurisdictions involved
meaningful amounts when considering that the clients were mostly
individuals. In New York, the average amount in dispute in 2019 was
$17,432,125 and in Georgia, the average amount in controversy was
$15,155.126 Clients made more than eighty percent of the requests for
arbitration in New York, while clients made sixty percent of the
requests in the District of Columbia.1 2 7 In some jurisdictions lawyers
disproportionately obtained awards while in others the clients were
favored. 128 The reasons for these differences remain to be explored.
122. See E-mail from Sharon McLawyer, Dir., Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n Att'y
Client Mediation & Arb. Servs., to Maryanne Daly-Doran, Reference Libr., Univ. of
Connecticut L. Libr. (July 6, 2021, 19:55 EDT) (on file with author); Chicago Bar
Association Professional Fees Committee Statistics (on file with author).
123.

2016 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS, supra note 82; 2006 ABA

SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART IV (2007) [hereinafter 2006 ABA SURVEY

OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART IV], https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/
administrative/professionalresponsibility/clientpro_migrated/Fee_Arb_Chart_4.pd
f [https://perma.cc/X4XK-5HEE]; OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF THE SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra
note 68, at 47 (reporting that matrimonial cases generated thirty-two percent of all fee
arbitration matters in NewJersey); N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD OF THE COURTS, supra note 83, at 9 (reporting that family matters constituted
the majority of cases handled). In the District of Columbia, however,
employment/EEO matters gave rise to the most fee arbitration matters. D.C. 2019-20
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 117, at 5.
124. N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS, supra
note 83, at 9; OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra note 68, at 47-48; 2016
ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS, supra note 82; 2006 ABA SURVEY OF FEE
ARBITRATION PROGRAMS CHART
125.

IV,

supranote 123.

N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS, supra

note 83, at 4.
126. GA. BOG BOARD BOOK, supra note 117, at 85-86. Of course, the amounts in
dispute were probably lower in jurisdictions where attorneys' fees are generally lower,
but most other jurisdictions did not report this information.
127. D.C. 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 117, at 4; N.Y. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS, supranote 83, at 17.
128. In the District of Columbia in 2019-20, in twelve out of twenty awards, lawyers
were the prevailing party. D.C. 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 117, at 7. Likewise,
in Maine, dispositions favored attorneys by a two-to-one ratio. ME. 2018 ANNUAL
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What seems clear, however, is that the voluntary fee arbitration
programs in most jurisdictions are insufficient to address the needs of
individual clients. These programs are more likely to be bar created
and bar run, with limited or no accountability to the courts. In some
large jurisdictions, voluntary fee dispute arbitration is handled by local
bar associations and is not available in all parts of the state.129 Lawyers
can refuse to participate in voluntary arbitration programs-and many
do. 130 The number of lawyers who decline to participate-like so much
else about voluntary programs-is not known. When lawyers refuse to
participate in fee arbitration, clients have little recourse except
litigation, which is frequently not a real option. Many individual clients
cannot afford to hire another lawyer and pay the litigation costs
associated with resolving fee disputes. Disciplinary agencies typically
decline to consider these complaints. 131 Thus, clients in states with
voluntary programs are often left with no viable recourse when fee
disputes arise.
III.

THE INADEQUACY OF MEASURES TO ADDRESS LAWYER THEFT

Lawyer theft of client money has been a longstanding problem for
the legal profession. 13 2 Lawyers steal from client trust accounts; pocket

REPORT, supranote 117, at 5 (reporting that hearing panel found in favor of lawyers in
nineteen matters and in favor of clients in six). In contrast, in only approximately onethird of the NewJersey cases in 2019 did the hearing panels uphold the attorneys' fees
in full. OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra note 68, at 46. In the balance,
they reduced the attorneys' fees by 28.4% of the total billings that were subject to
reductions. Id.
129. For example, in Illinois, where local bar associations handle fee arbitration
matters, there are some county bar associations that do not offer fee arbitration. See
How to Submit a Request for Investigation, supra note 110.
130.

See, e.g., 2016 ABA SURVEY OF FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS,

supra note

82

(reporting that eighty percent of lawyers declined to arbitrate clients' disputes in

Mississippi).
131.

See, e.g., LA. ATT'Y DISCIPLINARY BD., UPHOLDING STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT
(2016),
https://www.ladb.org/docs/Publication/LADBBrochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSC5-UPBS] ("Fee disputes are not normally handled within the
lawyer discipline system...."); Lawyer Disciplinary Board FAQ, W. VA. STATE BAR,
https: //wvbar. org/public-information/lawyer-disciplinary-board-faq
[https://perma.cc/UJ76-Y28L] (stating that "[f]ee matters ordinarily are not a basis for
discipline of a lawyer").
132. See, e.g., James R. Devine, Lawyer Discipline in Missouri: Is a New Ethics Code
Necessary?, 46 Mo. L. REv. 709, 713-14 (1981) (describing an 1825 Missouri statute
permitting disbarment of lawyers convicted of a felony for retaining his client's money
after the client demanded its return).
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insurance settlement checks, payments received in connection with
real estate closings or the proceeds of estates; or refuse to refund
unearned fees. When they steal, they often victimize more than one
client. 133 States' rules of professional conduct contain detailed
provisions for how lawyers are to safeguard client money,134 but those
rules have failed to prevent some lawyers from stealing from their
clients.
Forty years ago, the ABA began to adopt model rules for client
protection that were directly aimed at addressing lawyer thefts. 135 The
first was the Model Rules for Client Security Funds, but the states' funds
often fail to cover all of victims' losses. 136 The ABA also adopted Model
Rules for Trust Account Overdraft Notification, which require financial
institutions to notify lawyer disciplinary authorities when an overdraft
occurs in a client trust account. 13 7 Most states have also adopted this
measure, 13 yet it only detects defalcations when the lawyer has
completely emptied a trust account. The ABA subsequently
recommended additional client protection measures, including its
Model Rulefor Payee Notificationand Model Rules for Random Audit of Trust
Accounts, but most jurisdictions have not adopted these measures. 139
The net effect is that many states fail to adequately protect individual
clients from overreaching lawyers.

133. See, e.g., David W. Leefe, ClientAssistance Fund; CompensatingforLawyer Misdeeds,
Repairing the Negative Image, LA. B.J.,June/July 2002, at 32, 33-34.
134.

See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.15.

135.

A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 72.

136.

See MODEL RULES FOR CLIENT SECURITY FUNDS (AM. BARASS'N 1981); infra notes

158, 160-64 and accompanying text.
137. A History of the Client ProtectionRules, supra note 72; MODEL RULES FOR TR. ACCT.
OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION (AM. BARASS'N 1988).

138.

SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at

42.
139. The ABA also recommends one other measure to protect client money from
misappropriation, which sets standards for maintaining client trust account records.
See MODEL RULE ON FIN. RECORDKEEPING (AM. BAR ASS'N 1993). Some states require
certification of compliance with the jurisdiction's recordkeeping rules. See SURVEY OF
LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42-43.
Unfortunately, certification measures seem unlikely to prevent a lawyer who wishes to
steal client money from doing so.
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A. Client ProtectionFunds
When lawyers steal client funds, the money is usually gone before
the theft is detected.14 Malpractice insurance does not cover these
losses,"" and lawyers who steal often have no other money with which
to repay their victims."2 Even if the lawyers are ordered to make
restitution, they may be unable to do so because they are disbarred,
imprisoned, or both. Thus, the only way that some clients can recover
any of their money is by making a claim to a jurisdiction's client
protection fund.
In 1981, when the ABA first adopted Model Rules for Client Security
Funds (later renamed the Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client
Protection), most jurisdictions already had established some form of
client protection fund. 143 The purpose of the funds-from the
organized bar's perspective-is to preserve the public's trust in the
integrity of the legal profession. 144 The ABA's Model Rules for Lawyers'
Fundsfor Client Protection provide that the funds should be established
under the supervision of the state's highest court and be part of the
jurisdiction's lawyer regulation system. 145 They further state that client
protection funds should reimburse failures "to refund unearned fees
received in advance" as well as "theft or embezzlement of money or the
wrongful taking or conversion" of money or property." These model
rules contemplate that the funds will "fully reimburse losses"14 7 and
provide for the state supreme court to provide for funding by lawyers

140. See Leefe, supranote 133 at, 33-34.
141. See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal MalpracticeInsurance:Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28
J. LEGAL PRO. 41, 52 (2004) (noting that lawyers' professional liability policies do not
cover claims arising from dishonest, malicious, or fraudulent acts of an insured).
142.

See MODEL RULES FOR LAWS.' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROT. pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS'N

1989). In some cases, the lawyers may have also filed for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Lawyer

Disciplinary Bd. v. Thorn, 783 S.E.2d 321, 329 (W. Va. 2016).
143.

See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra note

1,

at 13-14.
144. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWS.' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROT. r. L.A (AM. BAR ASS'N
1989); see also Lawyers Fund, STATE BAR OF MONT., https://www.montanabar.org/Forthe-Public/Client-Protection-Fund [https://perma.cc/KDN7-7Q45]; Client Protection
Fund, STATE BAR OF N.D., https://www.sband.org/page/clientprotect_claim
[https://perma.cc/X7Y8-QXK4].
145.

MODEL RULES FOR LAWS.' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROT. r.

1 cmt.

3, r. 2(2)

(AM.

BAR

Ass'N 1989).
146. Id. at r. 10(C). This includes "where the lawyer took money in the guise of a
fee, a loan or an investment." Id. at r. 10 cmt. 3.
147. Id. at pmbl.
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"in amounts adequate for the proper payment of claims."' 8 In an
apparent compromise among the drafters, however, the rules also
recognize that the fund's Board of Trustees may fix a maximum
amount of reimbursement, even though "[f]ull reimbursement is the
goal of a Fund."1 4 9
Today, all U.S.jurisdictions have statewide client protection funds,'
but their "organization, funding, accessibility and responsiveness to
client claims vary widely."151 In many states, they are supervised by state
bar organizations rather than the courts.152 In more than thirty
jurisdictions, the funds are financed by mandatory lawyer assessments,
while the rest are funded by budget appropriations, voluntary lawyer
contributions, or other means. 15 The lawyer assessments range from
$5 to $75 annually, except in Delaware, where the assessment is
substantially higher. 154 The funds' boards of trustees are also
empowered to seek restitution from the offending attorneys, but those
recoveries tend to be modest. 155 Most of the jurisdictions have payment
caps per claimant, with the average cap being $100,000.156 The majority
also have a payment cap per lawyer, with the caps ranging from $20,000
to $1.5 million. 157 In some years, the amounts available in some
jurisdictions' client protection funds exceed the legitimate claims. 158

148.
149.

Id. at r. 3(a).
Id. at r. 14(1) & cmt.

150.

DIRECTORY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION,

151.

A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 72.

152.

See, e.g., ABA CTR FOR PRO. RESP.,

2014-2016

supranote

10.

SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR

CLIENT PROTECTION 3 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional-responsibility/2014_16_surveyoflawyersfunds_for_
clientprotection_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C8Y-768Q].
153. SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at

17-18.
154. Delaware lawyers in private practice who have been admitted more than ten
years are required to pay $336. Id. at 19.
155. See, e.g., Mo. BAR, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2020), https://mobar.org/site/
content/About/Annual_Report.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XN5X-FDAL]
(reporting
less than $90,000 of restitution recovered in preceding year); STATE BAR OF NEv.,
CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2020), https://nvbar.org/wp-content/

uploads/2020-Nevada-CSF-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8P6G-L9L7]
(reporting that about $5,000 of restitution recovered).
156. This is based on the thirty-eightjurisdictions reporting to the ABA. See SURVEY
OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 3.

157.

Id. at 25-26.

158. Id. at 8 (noting "several funds" reported an inability to reimburse eligible
claims due to payment limitations or lack of available funds).
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Client protection funds in the United States paid out about $35
million in 2019,159 although clients' actual monetary losses far
exceeded that amount. This is mostly because the funds' caps on
recovery are grossly insufficient in some cases.160 For example, Nevada
lawyer Robert Graham, whose probate and real estate practice "was a
20-year business failure" stole $17 million from clients.161 Twenty-three
of his clients filed claims with Nevada's Client Security Fund in the
"approved" amount of $7.85 million, but due to Nevada's $50,000 per
claimant cap, these clients recovered less than $1.1 million. 162 Even
with Pennsylvania's $100,000 per victim cap, eleven clients' losses
exceeded that cap in 2019.163 A payment cap per lawyer can also leave

159. The client protection funds that responded to the ABA's most recent survey
reported that they paid out approximately $32.3 million in 2019. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS'
FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 4. Florida, Missouri, South
Carolina, and the District of Columbia are among the jurisdictions that did not report to
the ABA. Florida alone paid out at least $2 million. See Annual Reports of Committees of the
Florida Bar, Clients' Security Fund, FLA. BAR J., May/June 2019, at 88, 99, https://
www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/annual-reports-of-committees-of-the-floridabar2018-2019/#Clients_Security_Fund
[https://perma.cc/6249-WPXL];
Noreen
Marcus, FloridaBarHas Money-Back Guaranteefor Clients of Thieving Lawyers, but Collecting

Isn't Easy, FLORIDABULLDOG.ORG (May 9, 2018), https://www.floridabulldog.org/
2018/05/florida-bar-has-money-back-guarantee-for-clients-of-thieving-lawyers-butcollecting-isnt-easy [https://perma.cc/KS9Z-TF3N]. Claims paid in South Carolina
during the 2019-20 year totaled $445,793. S.C. BAR, LAWYERs' FUND FOR CLIENT
PROTECTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2020), https://www.scbar.org/

media/filerpublic/67/ac/67ace869-56d7-415f-blOa-b36faadf2cc5/lfcpar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FLK-6GSF].
160. For instance, in Nevada, thirty-eight eligible clients had $2.5 million of
approved losses in 2020 but only received $260,000-about one-tenth of that
amount-from the client security fund. NEv. ANNUAL REPORT 2020, supranote 117, at
4. In Tennessee, the most common problem experienced by the client protection fund
was "[l]arge claim losses exceeding Fund caps." SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT
PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 12; see also Elizabeth Amon, An Empty Promise:
How Client Protection Funds Around the Nation Betray Those They Were Designed to Protect,

N.J. L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at 4.
161. Jeff German, State Bar of Nevada Wants to Disbar Lawyer Charged with Stealing
Millionsfrom Clients, LAS VEGAS REv.J. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.reviejournal.com
/local/local-las-vegas/state-bar-of-nevada-wants-to-disbar-lawyer-charged-with-stealingmillions-from-clients [https://perma.cc/4CCU-LE3S].
162.

See STATE BAR OF NEv., CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND ANNUAL REPORT

2019, at 6,

https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-Nevada-CSF-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RVN-769W]. Some of his other clients' claims had not yet been
resolved at the time of the report. Id.
163.

PA. LAWS. FUND FOR CLIENT SEC., REPORT ON

2019-20

OPERATIONS 2, https://r

91.5e5.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Report-2019-2020.pdf
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clients grossly undercompensated. For example, one client only
received $20,000-one-tenth of the money her Kentucky lawyer stole
from her-because her lawyer had victimized many other clients and
the Kentucky Bar Association capped per lawyer recovery at
$150,000.164 Some jurisdictions place limits on the total amounts that
the funds will pay out annually to all claimants. 1 5 Florida only pays
misappropriation claims on a pro rata basis at the end of the year if
there is not enough money to pay all approved losses.166 It will only
refund unearned fees up to $5,000.167
While the Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client Protection
contemplate that the goal of the funds is full reimbursement, in many
jurisdictions, the states' funds are described as a "public service" that
carry no obligation to reimburse victims of lawyer defalcations. 168 And
indeed, many funds' rules and practices reflect no commitment to full
reimbursement of victims.169 Some of the funds operate with no court
oversight and little transparency; at least ten jurisdictions do not

[https://perma.cc/2ELD-RMBH]. According to the report, at the start of the 201920 fiscal year, the 159 pending claims carried an award potential of $2.97 million after
applying the $100,000 cap, but the actual claims exceeded $8.1 million. Id.
164. See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, Ripped-Off Legal Clients Say a Kentucky Fund that Was
Supposed to Reimburse Them Only Gave Them Pennies on the Dollar, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J.
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2019/02/25/

kentucky-fund-ripped-off-legal-clients-falls-far-short/2775939002

[https://perma.cc/

P2AB-PZ5H].
165. For example, Oklahoma's fund will only pay out a maximum of $175,000
annually for all claims. See OFF. OF GEN. COUNS. OF OKLA. BARASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMISSION 18 (2021), https://www.okbar.org/wp-

content/uploads/2021/02/2020-PRC-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZUN6UYVG].
166. Annual Reports of Committees of the Florida Bar, supra note 159, at 28; Marcus,
supra note 159.
167. See Clients' Security Fund Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. BAR, https://www.
floridabar.org/public/consumer/pamphlet007/#what-losses-are-covered [https://pe
rma.cc/HGR4-HDQ4]. While advance fees paid by individual clients often fall within
this range, they sometimes exceed that amount. See, e.g., In re Fleming, 970 So. 2d 970
(La. 2017) (per curiam) (describing lawyer who refused to refund any of $25,000 fee);
In re Hoffman, 834 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 2013) (describing lawyer who failed to refund
any of $30,000 fee where reasonable fee was $4,540).
168.

See, e.g., N.H. RULES OF THE SUP.

FUND FOR CLIENT PROT.

241

CT.

r.

55(1);

KAN. RULE RELATING TO LAwS.'

(a) (3).

169. See, e.g., MONT. LAWS.' FUND FOR CLIENT PROT. r. 10 (stating that there is no
legal right to reimbursement and that all payments "are a matter of grace"). In
Missouri, payments are limited to eighty percent of the amount of the loss greater than
$5,000, with a maximum payment of $50,000. See Mo. BAR, supranote 155, at 5.
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publish any sort of annual report.17 1 Some states' funds that publish
reports do not reveal the difference between the amounts victims
actually lost and the amounts paid to them by the funds.171
Most fund claimants are clients whose lawyers retained unearned
fees.172 The funds also pay out substantial dollar awards for thefts in
personal injury, trust and estate, and real estate matters. 173 These
clients are sometimes unsophisticated consumers of legal services, yet
many funds are not administered from a consumer-oriented
perspective. In many jurisdictions, the availability of client protection
funds is not publicized.17 1 In most jurisdictions, clients' claims cannot
be submitted electronically.17 5 Although the Model Rules for Lawyers'
Fundsfor Client Protectionintend for the funds to provide "meaningful"
and "prompt" reimbursement to victimized clients,1 76 claimants
typically must wait for reimbursement until a final disciplinary
determination is made. 177 This can take years during which some
170.

SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra note 1, at

10.
171. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF ARIZ., ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 3, https://www.azbar.org/
media/f~pk5mo5/2019-annual-report-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XT6QFB2H]
(revealing the amount paid out but not the amount actually lost by victims); Annual Reports of
the Committees of theFloidaBar, supra note 159, at 28 (same); STATE BAR OF TEX., COMMISSION
FOR

LAWYER

DISCIPLINE

ANNUAL

REPORT

11

(2020),

https://www.texasbar.com/

AM/Template.cfin?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfin&Content
ID=41986 [https://perma.cc/JT5S-Z49X] (same); WASH. STATE BAR ASs'N, WASHINGTON
DISCIPLINE SYSTEM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 14, https://www.wsba.org/docs/defaultsource/licensing/discipline/2019-liscipline-system-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn-d5100ef1_10
[https://perma.cc/PN8R-Y9EU] (same).
172.

See, e.g., SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra

note 1, at 8.

173.

Id.

174. See id. at 10 (reporting that sixty-two percent of reporting jurisdictions do not
produce any public information or marketing material for their client protection
funds).
175. Id.
176.

See MODEL RULES FOR LAWS.' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROT. pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS'N

1989).
177.

55(4); SUP. CT.
§ 7 (C) (3); The Client Security Fund of the State Bar

See, e.g., RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR r. 7-2.4; N.H. RULES OF SUP. CT. r.

OF OHIO RULES FOR GOV'T OF THE BAR r. VIII,

of Texas, https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cftn?Section=FreeLegal_Information2
&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=34079 [https://perma.cc/CPJ7-4ZEX].
In California, the average time to pay out for its client security fund is three years. See Letter
from Leah T. Wilson, Exec. Dir., State Bar of California, to California Legis. Leaders (Mar.
15,
2018),
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/2018CientSecurityFundReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E42N-8TNP]. In Wisconsin, some approved payments to claimants were
deferred because the fund had insuflicient money. See STATE BAR OF WIS., ANNUAL REPORT OF
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clients may be unable to obtain the medical and other care that they
need while awaiting repayment of the money. There is no question that
whatever amount the client protection fund eventually pays victims is
better than nothing. But in most jurisdictions, more could be done for
these clients.
B.

InsurancePayee Notification

One way in which individual clients could be better protected from
theft is by making it harder for lawyers to steal insurance settlement
proceeds. Lawyers steal insurance proceeds in various ways including
the unauthorized settlement with an insurer of the client's claim,
forgery of the client's signature on settlement documents and checks,
and misappropriation of the client's share of the proceeds.' 7 1 In 2019,
twenty-nine percent of the dollars paid by client protection funds were
due to lawyer theft of insurance settlement funds.179 These thefts often
victimize seriously injured clients who require continuing medical
care.1 8 0

In 1991, the ABA approved a Model Rule for Payee Notification that
requires insurers to provide written notice to a claimant that they sent
a payment to the claimant's lawyer in an effort to reduce the possibility
that the lawyer can misappropriate the funds. 181 Fred Miller, the
former Executive Director of New York's Client Protection Fund (the
state that originated the insurance payee notification rule) 182 noted
that the rule "pretty well eliminated this type of claim in New York. But

THE WISCONSIN

LAWYERS'

FUND

FOR CLIENT

PROTECTION,

FISCAL YEAR

2018, at 2,

https://www.wisbar.org/forPublic/IHaveaDisputeWithMyLawyer/Documents/FY%2018

%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RX&9SMH].
178.

MODEL RULE FOR PAYEE NOTIFICATION Preface (AM. BARASS'N 1991).

179.

SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra note 1, at

8.
180. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas J. Stamm, former Chair, Oregon Client Security
Fund, to Oregon State Bar Bd. of Governors (Nov. 14, 2019) (on file with author)
(describing several claims involving losses far exceeding the $50,000 cap in which
"claimants suffered from ... permanent disabilities such as paralysis").
181. See A History of the Client ProtectionRules, supranote 72.
182. The Model Rulefor PayeeNotification was based on a New York rule that required
insurers to notify the payee in insurance settlements when it sent out checks to the
claimant's attorney in excess of $5,000. Id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,

§ 216.9(a) (1988).
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if it does occur, the rule also helps catch the defalcating lawyer." 183
Nevertheless, today only sixteen jurisdictions require insurance payee
notification.184

Some state bar associations came to support a payee notification rule
after becoming convinced that such a rule was needed to protect
lawyers' reputations or the solvency of client protection funds. For
example, in 2007, Virginia trial lawyers initially opposed efforts to
require insurance payee notification. 185 A few months later, after lawyer
Steven Conrad was arrested and charged with settling hundreds of
cases without clients' approval and signing their names to settlement
checks, the Virginia State Bar approved a payee notification rule.186
The Louisiana State Bar Association supported payee notification
legislation in 2011 after it saw the impact of claims due to thefts of
insurance settlement funds on Louisiana's Client Assistance Fund. 18 7
But the insurance industry opposed it on the grounds it was
burdensome and the bill did not progress to a vote in the legislature.188
In 2021, Oregon became the most recent state to adopt such a
requirement, which the Oregon State Bar actively supported after it
learned of substantial insurance settlement defalcations by a single
lawyer that resulted in numerous claims against its client security
fund. 189

183. Lynda C. Shely, The ABA Model Rulesfor TrustAccount Notification and Model Rule
for Payee Notification: Client Protection for the Next Millennium, PRO. LAw., Spring 2000, at

23, 23.
184. These jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Virginia. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supranote
1, at 44; Oregon State Bar, Meeting of the Board of Governors Minutes 172-75 (Feb.
12, 2021); 2021 Or. Laws Ch. 140 (S.B. 180). The Texas Insurance Commission
encourages insurers to notify clients when they send out settlement checks but does
not require it. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
185.

See Marc Davis, A Lawyer's Misdeeds Spur State Bar to Revisit Proposal, VIRGINIAN-

PILOT (Mar. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.pilotonline.com/news/article_93961

05f-71b9-5d12-b838-elc90e95cdfa.html.
186. Id.
187.

Leefe, supra note 133, at 34.

188.

Id.

See Testimony Before the S. Comm. onJudiciary and Ballot Measure 110Implementation in
Support of S.B. 180 with the 2Amendments on Behalf ofthe Oregon StateBar, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Or.
2021),
https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2021R1/Downloads/
PublicTestimonyDocument/12231
[https://perma.cc/H6D9-ZDK6]
(statement of
Amber Hollister, Gen. Counsel of the Oregon State Bar); Nigel Jaquiss, Lawmakers and
Oregon State Bar Weigh Protectionsfor Victims of Dishonest Lawyers, WILLAMETTE WK. (Feb. 15,
189.
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Other jurisdictions have declined to adopt payee notification,
sometimes due to the bar's indifference or resistance. For example,
the Florida Bar's Client Security Fund Committee recommended to
the Bar's Board of Governors in 1996 that it adopt payee notification,
but the Committee was unable to generate support for the proposal.19 0
Since then, lawyer misconduct involving insurance settlement checks
has repeatedly occurred.19 1 The State Bar of Arizona's Board of
Trustees also rejected such a rule.192 In a few states, the failure to adopt
payee notification was due to anticipated or actual insurance industry
opposition. 193 Several jurisdictions report that they have never even

2021, 10:27 PM), https://www.wweek.com/news/courts/2021/02/15/lawmakers-andoregon-state-bar-weigh-protections-for-victims-of-dishonest-lawyers
[https://perma.cc/
BR5W-VPBM] (describing Bar's response to thefts by lawyer Lori Deveney, who "allegedly
stole millions of dollars from her clients by cashing their settlement checks from insurers");
Letter from DouglasJ. Stamm, supra note 180.
190. See Annual Report: Committees of the Florida Bar, FLA. B.J.,June 1996, at 52,

73.
191.

See, e.g., In re Gray, 145 So. 3d 825 (Fla. 2014); Fla. Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So. 2d

502, 508 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Catalano, 685 So. 2d 1299, 1300-01 (Fla.
1996) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Sweeney, 730 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam);
Christy Turner, St. Johns County Lawyer Sentenced for Stealing Insurance Claim Settlements,
CBS47 (Jan. 10, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/st-johnscounty-lawyer-sentenced-for-stealing-insurance-claim-settlements/902467067
[https://perma.cc/J4YX-VCCY]; Disbarred Lawyer Arrested for Defrauding Clients out of
$700K FDLE Says, lOTAMPA BAY (Dec. 11, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.wtsp.com/
article/news/crime/former-clearwater-lawyer-fraud-arrest/67-ecec86e0-1373-4b05-a8f4fdc5e00f10ad [https://perma.cc/2T84-DNJY]; David J. Neal, An Orlando Lawyer Stole
$111, 000from Clients, Bar Says, Got Suspended and IgnoredIt, MIAMI HERALD (May 16, 2021,
10:28 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article251453043.html.
192. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supranote 1,
at 44; Telephone Interview by Adam Mackie, Reference Libr., Univ. of Conn. L. Libr.
with Karen Weigand Oschmann, Client Prot. Fund Admin., State Bar of Ariz. (May 6,

2020).
193. In one jurisdiction the voluntary state bar never formally took a position after
informal conversations revealed that because the legislature included many insurance
agents, such legislation was unlikely to pass. See E-mail from Adam Mackie, Reference
Libr., Univ. of Connecticut L. Libr., to author (June 2, 2021, 10:49 AM). In Michigan,
the state bar supported a payee notification rule, but it did not progress in the
legislature. See State Bar of Mich., Proposed Payee Notification Legislation, (Apr. 21,

2018), https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/4-21-18payee_notification.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BKD8-8ZA4]; 2017/2018 At the Capitol, MICH. BARJ., May 2018,
at
83,
http://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article
3394.pdf [https://perma.cc/45BB-CFW2]; see also supra note 188 and accompanying
text.
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considered the ABA's recommendation on payee notification.194 The
net effect is that individual clients are more vulnerable to lawyer theft
in states that do not require payee notification.
C. Random Audits of Trust Accounts
Some lawyers steal from clients by taking funds they are holding in
client trust accounts. In an effort to reduce these thefts, the ABA's
McKay Commission recommended in 1992 that courts adopt a rule
providing for random audits of client trust accounts.1 9 5 At that time,
eight jurisdictions already used random audits, and the McKay
Commission noted that they had "proven effective to deter and detect
the theft of funds even before clients file complaints." 196 In 1993, the
ABA adopted the Model Rulefor Random Audit of Trust Accounts.19 7 A few
additional jurisdictions subsequently adopted
random audit
procedures. 198 Today, however, there are only nine states with
operational random audit programs.199
One of those states is Connecticut, which first considered random
audits in the late 1980s after a prominent Danbury lawyer stole more
than $2 million from his client trust account.20 0 In 1990, the
Connecticut Bar Association's (CBA) Task Force on the Commission
of Legal Ethics recommended a host of measures to improve lawyer
regulation, including random audits of trust accounts. 20 1 The CBA's
Board of Governors endorsed the proposal, but the CBA's House of
194.

SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra note 1, at

44-45.
195.

LAWYER REGULATION FORA NEW CENTURY, supranote 71, at 75. It explained that

the usual requirement imposed on disciplinary counsel to show cause to believe
misconduct occurred before permitting an audit made it difficult to detect thefts that
were ongoing. Id. at 76.
196. Id. at 76. The jurisdictions were Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York
(First and Second Departments), North Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
197.

A History of The Client ProtectionRules, supranote 72.

198. The jurisdictions are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, and Maine.
See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42;
HAW. RULES GOVERNING TR. ACCT. r. 7.

199. Those jurisdictions are Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. See OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF
SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra note 68, at 49.
200. See Andrew Houlding, Price of Propriety: $300 Per Lawyer, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov.
25, 1991, at 32; Talks Urged in Suits Against Judge'sEstate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1988, at
48. The lawyer was also working as a probate judge, but the defalcations were due to
theft of money connected to real estate transactions.
201. Houlding, supra note 200.
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Delegates narrowly rejected it. 202 The following year, Connecticut's
Judicial Council on Legal Ethics also recommended random audits,
contending it was an essential part of the package of recommended
reforms. 203 The Connecticut Supreme Court, which was then dealing
with its own budget problems was reportedly reluctant "to take on a
fight to squeeze more money out of legal practitioners" to finance
regulatory reforms and wanted the CBA's Task Force Chair to take the
lead on getting the CBA to accept the reforms.2 " The Task Force chair
was apparently unable to garner CBA support. It was not until 2006,
the year after Connecticut lawyers misappropriated more than $12.5
million during a three-month period, that a CBA Task Force again
recommended random audits. 20 5 It seems worth noting that the thefts
had attracted significant attention in the popular press. 20 6 It was only
then-and without input from the CBA House of Delegates-that the
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a rule enabling random trust
account audits. 20 7
NewJersey has been a national leader in the use of random audits. 208
Its Office of Attorney Ethics acknowledges that the deterrent effect is
"not quantifiable" but maintains that "[j]ust knowing there is an active
audit program is an incentive not only to keep accurate records, but
also to avoid temptations to misuse trust funds." 20 9 In 2019, New
Jersey's Random Audit Compliance Program conducted 556 audits.
Fourteen lawyers were disciplined-including four disbarmentsthrough the program's detection efforts.21 0 Over the program's thirty-

202.

Id.
Why Lawyers Must Payfor Ethics Reform, CONN. L. TRiB., Nov. 25, 1991, at 32.
204. Houlding, supra note 200.
205. See Douglas Malan, PracticeBook Rules Bare Teeth, CONN. L. TRIB., May 22, 2006.
206. See, e.g., Hilda Munoz, Suspended Lawyer Is Arraigned; Elizabeth Zemko Accused of
Stealingfrom Clients'BankAccounts, Estates, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2005, at B2; Fran
Silverman, Crackingdown on UnethicalLawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 3; Daniel
Tepper, Claims Coming Fastfor Victims of Lawyers, CONN. POST, Sept. 1, 2005; Father, Son
Accused of Stealing Clients'Money, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2005.
207. See Douglas Malan, Judges Embrace Lawyer-Theft Crackdown; Increased Policing of
Attorney Advertisements Also Wins FinalApproval, CONN. L. TRiB., July 3, 2006.
208. OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF SUP. CT. OF N.J., supra note 68, at 49.
209. Id.
210. Letter from Charles Centinaro, Dir., N.J. Office of Att'y Ethics, to ChiefJustice
Stuart Rabner and Associate Justices of the N.J. Sup. Ct. (May 11, 2020), https://
njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2019oaeannualrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Q3B203.

E9LR].

482

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:447

nine-year existence, 234 attorneys, "detected solely by this program,
have been disciplined for serious ethical violations.""
Jurisdictions offer a variety of reasons when they decline to adopt
random audit programs. Some conclude that the cost of a random
audit program would be too great to justify imposing the expense on
lawyers. 212 As the Florida State Bar's president explained after the idea
was considered and rejected there, "[f]irst of all, who's going to pay for
it?" He continued, "[t]he bar can't afford to hire an auditing firm to
go around the state and audit lawyers' trust accounts." 213 Others note
that these audits mostly pick up low-level, unintentional errors. 214 Some
contend that random audits do not pick up all defalcations because
lawyer theft does not necessarily involve trust account violations. 215 In
addition, opponents argue, general audit practice is to reconcile trust
account balances, and such auditing may be insufficient to detect
defalcations. 26

Yet New Jersey's experience demonstrates that the audits can be
performed by auditors in ways that detect lawyer theft.217 While the cost
of random audits cannot be ignored, the number of audits need not
necessarily be substantial to have some deterrent effect. Meanwhile,
lawyer theft from client trust accounts remains a serious problem.
Lawyers who steal from these accounts sometimes take large sums of

211.

OFF. OF ATT'Y ETHICS OF SUP.

CT.

OF

N.J.,

2020 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY

DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM REPORT 17 (2021), https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/
oae/2020oaeannualrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/86FA-KFMX].
212. See In re Promulgation of Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court for
Registration of Attorneys, Annual Report of the Minnesota Client Security Board, C9-81-1206,
at A.19-A.20 (July 1998), https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Administrative

FileArchive/Client%20Security%20Board%20ADM10-8026%20(formerly%20C0-852205)/1998-07-28-Client-Security-Bd-Annual-Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D3N-CAJ4].
213. Celia Ampel, Sticky Fingers:Attorney Thefts from Clients Spiked in Great Recession,
DAILY BUS. REv. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/03/
09/sticky-fingers-attorney-thefts-from-clients-spiked-in-great-recession

[https://perma.cc/BPY2-UJ7S].
214. See, e.g., Gary Blankenship, Trust Accounting PilotProgramMay Be Ready for Board
Action in March, FLA. BAR NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.floridabar.org/theflorida-bar-news/trust-accounting-pilot-program-may-be-ready-for-board-action-inmarch [https://perma.cc/RU44-FJQE].
215. In re Promulgation of Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court for
Registration of Attorneys, supra note 212, at 20.

216.

Id.

217.

See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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money. 218 These thefts can continue for months or even years before
they are detected. 219 Some of these losses might have been deterred or
averted if the jurisdictions had adopted rules enabling regulators to
randomly audit client trust accounts.
IV.

WHAT HAPPENED TO CLIENT PROTECTION?

What explains the failure by many jurisdictions to adopt adequate
client protection measures? To answer this question, it is necessary to
start with the state supreme courts, which in most jurisdictions are
ultimately responsible for adopting the rules governing lawyers. As
previously noted, these courts also have a number of other important
responsibilities, some of which may present more obvious, pressing or
pervasive challenges. Given the demands of other court business, state
supreme courts may not have the time or inclination to examine the
adequacy of the client protection measures in their states unless the
bar, state regulators, or the media bring a problem to their attention.

218. See, e.g., Kelsey Gibbs, Fallen State Trooper'sDaughter Speaks out on Attorney Going
to Prison for Stealing from Clients, NEWSCHANNEL5 NASHVILLE (Apr. 22, 2019),
https://www.newschannel5 .com/news/attorney-sentenced-for-stealing-more-thanim-from-clients-trust-funds (discussing Tennessee attorney who stole over $1.35
million from clients' accounts); R. Robin McDonald, DisbarredLawyer Sentenced to
FederalPrisonfor StealingEscrowedFunds, DAILY REP. (July 21, 2020, 2:54 PM) (discussing
Georgia lawyer who stole more than $335,000 from escrow account); Debra Cassens
Weiss, Millions Missingfrom Lawyer's Trust Account, BarAlleges After He Abruptly Closes Law
Firm,
A.B.A.
J.
(Jan.
5,
2017,
10:05
AM),
https://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer-transferred-hometohiswifeafterabruptly
_closing_law_firm_barall [https://perma.cc/7U9P-CW6K]; FormerRealEstateAttorney
Sentenced to 66 Months in Prisonfor Defrauding Clients and Lenders, U.S. ATT'Y'S OFF. FOR
DIST. OF MASS. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-realestate-attorney-sentenced-66-months-prison-defrauding-clients-and-lenders
[https://perma.cc/8VQW-GE2Q] (describing Massachusetts lawyer who stole over
$450,000 from client trust account); DisbarredHouston Lawyer Steals More than $500, 000
from Client, OFF. OF DIST. ATT'Y, HARRIS CNTY. TEx. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://app.
dao.hctx.net/disbarred-houston-lawyer-steals-more-500000-client [https://perma.cc/
XK79-KLL6] (describing misappropriation from client trust account).
219.

See, e.g., DisbarredLawyer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Client Escrow Funds, DIST. ATT'Y

KINGS CNTY. (June 4, 2015), http://www.brooklynda.org/2015/09/10/disbarredlawyer-pleads-guilty-to-stealing-client-escrow-funds
(describing lawyer who stole
hundreds of thousands of dollars from more than twenty-five clients over more than
four-year period); Zak Fallia, DisbarredAttorney Charged with Stealingfrom Escrow Fund
Accounts in Westchester, ARMONK DAILY VOICE (Sept. 7, 2019), https://dailyvoice.com/
new-york/armonk/news/disbarred-attorney-charged-with-stealing-from-escrow-fundsaccounts-in-westchester/775163 [https://perma.cc/DL4Z-PLKJ] (describing lawyer
who stole from escrow accounts over four-year period).
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Moreover, supreme court justices do not see many fee disputes
between lawyers and individual clients; those clients can rarely afford
to litigate those issues to the state's highest court. Courts may not focus
on the operation of fee arbitration programs as they are typically barrun activities. Likewise, courts may be unaware of the inadequacy of
the payments to some victims of dishonest lawyers when they do not
oversee their states' client protection funds.22
And what about the state legislatures? Legislatures tend to give the
courts a wide berth on issues pertaining to lawyer regulation.2 21 This is
because state courts claim the inherent or constitutional authority to
regulate the practice of law,22 2 and a few claim the exclusive right to do
so. 223 Legislators may harbor concerns that any law they pass regulating

the legal profession could be struck down on separation of powers
grounds.22 4 Moreover, there is rarely anyone lobbying for legislative
involvement to protect the public's interests. Economic theory helps
explain the public's absence from the debates. Producers of goods and
services (in this case, lawyers) are more likely to invest in political
action than are consumers due to producers' narrow focus on their
own products or income, in contrast to consumers' more varied areas
of concern.22

The most motivated actor when it comes to lawyer regulation is the
legal profession itself, and it can play an outsized role in lawyer

220. Even if supreme courts review client protection funds' reports, those reports
often do not reveal the differences between what the funds paid out and the amounts
actually lost by claimants. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 20, at 1007. The exception is California, which takes
a more active role in lawyer regulation than other jurisdictions. See id. at 978, 1002-03.

222.

Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Mo. 1937) (en banc) (noting that the

Court "has [the] inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law");
Unauthorized Prac. of L. Comm. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex.
2008) (stating that the court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law derives
from the state constitution); see also Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and LitigatingAgainst
"Legal Bootleggers"-The Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts'Inherent

Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REv.

65, 69

(2009).

223. See In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (Ill. 1899); Clark, 101 S.W.2d at 983-84; In re
Brown, 708 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Neb. 2006) (per curiam); In re Splane, 16 A. 481, 483
(Pa. 1889); Rigertas, supranote 222, at 69; Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation-TheRole of the Inherent-PowersDoctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 6-7

(1989).
224. See Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of Bar Admission: Lessons from the Pandemic,
HOFSTRA L. REv. (forthcoming 2021).
225.

See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF

THEORY OF GROUPS 10-36 (1971).
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regulation. After the ABA promulgates model rules, state bars usually
weigh in on whether those rules should be adopted in their
jurisdictions, either on their own initiative or at the state supreme
court's request. 226 Both mandatory and voluntary state bars engage in
these activities. In some jurisdictions, mandatory bars can be especially
influential in this process.
The mandatory (or "unified") bars began to appear in the 1920s
because some lawyers believed that a compulsory statewide association,
well-financed by dues and possessing the power to discipline members,
could influence state legislatures far better than a voluntary, financially
weak bar organization. 227 Proponents thought that these bars would be
beneficial for lawyers' economic interests, 228 and mandatory bars could
also benefit the public because they provided a means of gaining
greater resources to raise the quality of the legal profession and fill a
regulatory vacuum. 229 Today, statutes or court rules in some states
provide for participation by mandatory state bar organizations in
changes to the rules governing lawyers. 230 Rule proposals from a few
mandatory state bars require votes by rank-and-file members. 23 1 In
other jurisdictions, the courts routinely solicit the mandatory bar's
views or wait for the state bar to make proposals. 232 Not surprisingly,
lawyers are often reluctant to endorse regulation that adds to their
obligations or subjects themselves to greater scrutiny.
Texas's approach to client protection illustrates some of this
dynamic. Texas does not require lawyers to provide written fee
agreements in most matters or submit to mandatory fee arbitration. 233
226. See, e.g., supranote 47.
227. See DAYTON D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 36, 39-40, 43-44, 48 (1963).
228. Id. at 34, 36. Proponents believed that mandatory bars could both restrict the
number of lawyers and set minimum fee schedules. See Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of
Compulsory Professionalism:How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 35, 38 (1994).
229. See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing
from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH.J. 1, 17-18.
230. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 9.490(1) (2020). The mandatory North Carolina State
Bar has statutory power to adopt rules and regulations for the bar, which shall be
certified to the supreme court, and the court may only decline to have them entered
if the chiefjustice concludes they are inconsistent with the statute governing the state
bar. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21 (2020).
231. See, e.g., IDAHO BAR COMM'N RULES r. 906(a); infra note 238 and accompanying
text.

232.

See, e.g., Levin, supra note 20, at 1028.

233.

TExAs DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.04(c); SURVEY OF LAWYERS'

FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supranote 1, at 44. Texas is also one of only
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It is one of only three states that does not require trust account
overdraft notification and has not adopted an insurance payee
notification requirement or random audits. 234 Texas lawyers have
collectively stolen millions of dollars from clients, 235 yet Texas caps
payments from its Client Security Fund at $40,000 per claimant. 236

two states where disciplinary counsel must show that a lawyer's fee is "unconscionable"
rather than simply "excessive" in order to impose discipline. See SUNSET ADVISORY
COMMISSION STAFF REPORT

WITH FINAL RESULTS

16

(2017),

https://www.sunset.

texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/State%20Bar%20of%2OTexas%20and%20

Board%20of%20
Law%20Examiners%20Staff%20Report%20with%20Final%20Results_6-21-17_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U4X-4UBC].
234. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at
42, 44. In 2010, the State Bar of Texas did, however, ask the Texas Insurance Commissioner
to assist with efforts to prevent lawyer thefts and in turn, the Commission "strongly
encourage [d]" insurers to voluntarily notify claimants that the settlement checks were sent
to their lawyers. See Commissioner's Bulletin B-0035-10, TEx. DEP'T OF INS. (Aug. 31, 2010),
https://www.tdi.texas.gov/bulletins/2010/cc34.html
[https://perma.cc/KB3Q8Q9Z].
Nevertheless, lawyer theft of settlement checks continues to occur in Texas, suggesting that
not all insurers are complying with the request. See, e.g., Andrew Moore, "There Was Always
an Excuse": Killeen Ex-Attorney Costs Clients Thousands, Texas Supreme Court Says, KCEN (Feb.
23, 2020), https://www.kcentv.com/article/news/local/central-texas-attorney-resigns/50

0-980798b5-dfe2-4a66-bf82-44elbc09bebc

[https://perma.cc/9DX2-SWNF]

(describing

lawyer who settled case and took insurance money without client's knowledge); Brenda
Sapino Jeffreys, Ex-Client Sues Onetime Lawyer over Settlement Money, TEx. LAW., May 1, 2015,
at 9 (describing client who did not learn that lawyer had settled case and obtained
insurance proceeds for almost two years); John Rupolo, FormerAbileneAttorney Burt Burnett
Pleads Guilty to Not Paying Clients Settlement Money, KTXS12 (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://ktxs.com/news/crime-watch/former-abilene-attorney-burt-burnett-pleads-guiltyto-not-paying-clients-settlement-money
[https://perma.cc/EH26-XV9A]
(describing
lawyer who stole more than $575,000 from clients); Veronica Soto, Abilene Attorney Pleads
Not Guilty to Stealing Insurance Settlement Money from Clients, KTXS12 (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://ktxs.com/news/big-country/abilene-attorney-pleads-not-guilty-to-stealinginsurance-settlement-money-from-clients [https://perma.cc/3MRC-KUL8]; Disciplinay
Actions, TEx. B.J.,June 2020, at 412-13.
235. See, e.g., OFF. OF DIST. ATT'Y, HARRIS CNTY. TEX., supra note 218 (describing
Houston lawyer who misappropriated $500,000); Scott Gordon, DallasAttorney Indicted in
Client's Theft, 5NBCDFW (June 14, 2018, 9:49 AM), https://www.nbcdfw.com
/news/local/dallas-attorney-indicted-in-clients-theft/235097 [https://perma.cc/H8URRU3M] (reporting on lawyer theft of $365,000); Martha Neil, Suspended Texas PILawyer
Gets 35 Years in Client Theft Case, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 29, 2008, 9:18 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
former-pi-lawyer-gets_35_years inclienttheftcase
[https://perma.cc/N7QK22QW] (describing lawyer who stole $1.6 million from clients).
236. SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at

26.
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So what is going on in Texas? In Texas, the supreme court regularly
seeks the Texas State Bar's views on issues pertaining to lawyer
regulation and the bar often responds in ways that reflect its members'
interests. 237 Although the Texas Supreme Court has the inherent
authority to adopt rules governing Texas lawyers, the Texas State Bar
Act provides for a state bar referendum on rule proposals before the
supreme court adopts rules governing the conduct of state bar
members. 23 The Texas Supreme Court "has historically chosen to
defer to a vote of state bar members before making significant
changes" to its Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.239 So, after a
torturous eight-year process to amend the Texas rules to bring them
more in line with the ABA's Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct-which
involved several public hearings and reconciling draft amendments
submitted by a Supreme Court Task Force, the state bar, and the Texas
Supreme Court24 0-a 2011 state bar referendum to amend the Texas
rules failed in all respects. 24 This occurred even though the final draft
submitted to Texas State Bar members was one that had been

237. For example, when the Texas Supreme Court considered whether to adopt a
rule requiring uninsured lawyers to disclose that they did not carry malpractice
insurance-another ABA-recommended client protection measure-it sought the
Texas State Bar's views. See Levin, supranote 20, at 1022-23. Not surprisingly, many
Texas lawyers opposed such a measure. Id. at 1022, 1024. The State Bar Board of
Governors communicated this opposition to the supreme court, which then declined
to adopt an insurance disclosure rule. Id. at 1024.
238. TEx. Gov'T CODE § 81.024 (b)-(g) (2016); SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF
REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supranote 233, at 13; NATHAN L. HECHT ET AL., TEX.JUD.
BRANCH, How TEXAS COURT RULES ARE MADE 3-4 (2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/
[https://perma.cc/8PH4-TX9Q].
media/1374851/How-Court-Rules-Are-Made.pdf
From 1987 to 2021, the State Bar of Texas held six referenda. Only three passed. Id. at
4; Lowell Brown, Texas Lawyers Approve Rule Amendments in 2021 Rules Vote, STATE BAR
OF TEX. (Mar. 4, 2021), https://blog.texasbar.com/2021/03/articles/state-bar/texaslawyers-approve-rule-amendments-in-2021-rules-vote
[https://perma.cc/6N8G6FWL].
239.

SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS,

supra note

233, at 13.
240. See Approval of Proposed Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, Misc. Docket. No. 09-9175 (Tex. Oct. 20, 2009); Timeline of
Development of Proposed Rules.
241.

See State Bar of Texas Announces Results of Referendum on ProposedAmendments to the

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, STATE BAR OF TEX. (Feb. 17, 2011),

https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Press_Releases&Template=/
CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=12942 [https://perma.cc/99NX-7GDV].
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approved by the state bar leadership. 242 The Texas Supreme Court
adopted no rule changes at that time.
Although the State Bar of Texas is also subject to sunset reviews by
the Texas legislature every twelve years, 243 that process has only led to
modest improvements in client protection. In 1990, the Sunset
Commission staff recommended that Texas's Client Security Fundwhich had been established in 1975 by the state bar-should be
statutorily placed under the oversight of the Texas Supreme Court,
that the caps on payments to victims should be raised, and that the
fund should be required to maintain a minimum balance. 244 In
response, the state bar increased its fund's claims cap from $20,000 to
$30,000 and required a minimum fund balance of $1.25 million.2 4 5
Once the state bar did this, the Texas legislature did not provide for
supreme court oversight of the bar-run Client Security Fund, as the
Sunset Commission recommended.24 6
In the most recent sunset review cycle (2016-2017), the Texas State
Bar's Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the Sunset Commission staff
recommended trust account overdraft notification, but the Sunset
Commission, which is composed of twelve Texas legislators, did not
adopt the recommendation. 24 The reason was apparently due, in part,

242.

See Kennon L. Peterson, Proposed Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of

ProfessionalConduct: Brief Background and Explanation Updated November 2010, 73 TEx.

BARJ. 894, 894 (2010).
243. The reviews occur because the state bar is a state agency. See State Bar of Texas,
TEX. SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, https://www.sunset.texas.gov/reviews-and-reports/
agencies/state-bar-texas [https://perma.cc/3SZ3-5ZDG].
244.

See Sunset Commission Staff Report Recommendations Include Repeal of State BarAct,

PlacingBarFunds in State Treasury, 53 TEX. BARD. 865, 878-80 (1990).
245. SeeWalter Borges, 5, 000FacePossiblelOLTASuspensions;but StateBarEnforcement
Efforts Lagging; Behind the Bar, TEX. LAw., Oct. 1, 1990, at 31.
246.

See SUNSET ADVISORY COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF SUNSET LEGISLATION 36-37 (1991),

https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/Analysis%20of%2Suns

et%20Legislation%2072%20Leg%201991.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHL7-3KZU].
247. SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note
233, at A8, 26-27. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel sought both Trust Account
Overdraft Notification and Payee Notification during the last Sunset review. See STATE
BAR OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT TO THE SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION 93,

81

(Sept.

1,

2015),

278-

https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/

State%20Bar%20of%20Texas%20SER%20-%20Accessible.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2MR-ZUBE].
recommend payee notification.

The

Sunset

Commission

also

declined

to
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to legislators' concerns about burdening the banks. 248 The
Commission staff also recommended that the legislature repeal
requirements for a state bar referendum to approve disciplinary rule
changes because the state bar rulemaking process "[o]bstructs
[c] hanges [n] eeded" to regulate lawyers effectively. 249 Nevertheless, on
the motion of Sunset Commission member Senator Kirk Watson, a
former member of the Texas State Bar's Executive Committee,250 the
Sunset Commission "[m]odified" the Sunset staff's recommendation
and decided to retain the referendum process but streamline the Bar's
rulemaking process. 251 The legislature, in turn, established a new state
bar committee to improve the state bar's rulemaking process, which
included an opportunity for the public to provide input. 252 It retained
the state bar referendum process for proposed disciplinary rule
changes that originate with the State Bar of Texas. 253
As the Texas example suggests, mandatory bars include many
constituents, and there may be instances where there are
disagreements among bar leadership, bar regulators working within
the organization, state bar committees, and bar members when it
comes to lawyer regulation. Depending upon the attitudes of bar
leadership and the processes for gaining bar approval of certain
measures, there may be times when a mandatory bar expresses support
for consumer protection measures even though rank-and-file members

248. Three Sunset Commission members voiced this concern, including one who
referred to Texas as "the leading banking state." See Texas State Senate, Sunset Advisory
Commission Hearing (Aug. 22, 2016), http://tcsenate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.p

hp?viewid=40&clip_id=11260 [https://perma.cc/A8HX-KD36].
249.

SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS,

supra note

233, at 13.
250. See Meet Kirk, KIRK WATSON TEX. SENATOR, http://www.kirkwatson.com/meetkirk/father-and-attorney [https://perma.cc/G3RJ-ZDLC].
251.

SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS,

supra note

233, at A7.
252.

See TEX. STATE BAR ACT §§ 81.0876-79 (2017); SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION

STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note 233, at Al.

253. TEX. STATE BAR ACT §§ 81.0877-78. After the new state bar committee was
constituted in 2017, it vetted eight proposals that were approved by Texas State Bar
members in a 2021 referendum. None concerned protection of client money. See Texas
Lawyers Approve Rule Amendments in 2021 Rules Vote, supra note 238; COMMITTEE ON
DISCIPLINARY RULES

AND

REFERENDA,

2020 ANNUAL

REPORT

texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/CDRR/Annual_Reportsl
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/24JQD6WY].

8-13,

https://www.

/202OAnnual
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disagree.254 Obviously, when lawyer regulation is subject to bar
members' approval, it can be more difficult to implement regulation
that places additional obligations on lawyers.
In fact, even though mandatory bars claim that public protection is
part of their mission, several jurisdictions with mandatory bars have
adopted substantially fewer "client protection measures" than
jurisdictions with voluntary state bars. This may occur due to the
influence of mandatory bars on judicial decision making or because of
the state's process for rule adoption. One rough indicator that states
with mandatory bars, on the whole, may provide fewer of the client
protection measures discussed in this Article can be seen in the tables
below, which show the jurisdictions with the most and fewest client
protection measures.
"

Table 1. Jurisdictionswith Most Client ProtectionMeasures2
(*idictes
mandatory

Written
Fee

Mandatory
Fee

Trust
Overdraft

Alaska*

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

bar)

Random
CPF Cap Per
Audits of Trust
Claimant
2 6
Account
Agreemen Arbitration Notification Notification

Arizona*

x

California*

x

Connecticut

x

D.C.*

x

Hawaii*

x

$50,000

x

Delaware

Maine

Insurance
Payee

x

x

$100,000

$100,000

x
x

x

x

No cap
No cap

$100,000
x

x

$100,000

x

$50,000

254. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 20, at 1013-14 (reporting that the Board of
Governors of the Nevada Bar suggested a rule change despite fifty-six percent of
Nevada State Bar survey respondents expressing opposition).
255. For support for the data in Table 1, see supra notes 45, 84, 184, 199 and
accompanying text; SURVEY OF LAwYERs' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra
note 1, at 25; Clients' Security Fund, D.C. BAR, https://www.dcbar.org/for-thepublic/resolve-attomey-problems/clients%E2%80%99-security-fund
[https://perma.cc/TJ2E-Y4F]; E-mail from Mike Larson, Dir., Law. Assistance Program,
State Bar of Montana, to author (July 14, 2021, 10:18 EDT) (on file with author) (stating
there is no claim cap on the amount clients can recover, but recovery is limited to the
amount available in the fund).
256. The jurisdictions listed in this column have rules providing for random audits,
but it is not clear that they all continue to perform them. See supra note 199 and
accompanying text. Simply having these rules on the books, however, may have some
deterrent effect.
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Montana*

x

x

x

x

x

No cap

NewJersey

x

x

x

x

x

$400,000

New York

x

x

x

x

x2

$400,000

Pennsylvania

x

x

x

Nebraska

x

491

No cap

$100,000

Jurisdictions with at least three of the five client protection measures
previously discussed are included in Table 1, which shows the
jurisdictions with the most client protection measures. The
jurisdictions' per claimant caps on client protection fund awards are
also displayed but were not weighed when calculating which
jurisdictions were seemingly the most and least protective of clients.
While the caps on claimants' client protection fund recoveries are
indicative of ajurisdiction's commitment to client protection, the caps
may also vary due to differences in the claims experience in the
jurisdictions. Thus, Alaska and Maine are included in the table with
the most client protection measures even though they cap victims'
client protection fund recoveries at the relatively low amount of
$50,000.258 It seems noteworthy that the majority of states with the most
client protection measures are jurisdictions with voluntary state bars,
even though thirty-two of the fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States
have mandatory state bars. Stated differently, almost 37% of the
jurisdictions with voluntary state bars appear in Table 1 while only
18.75% of the jurisdictions with mandatory bars appear there. 259
257.

Only New York's First and Second Departments provide for random audits. See
§ 603.27; N.Y. APP. DIV. SECOND DEP'T RULES

N.Y. APP. Div. FIRST DEP'T RULES

§ 691.12(a).
258. The Alaska State Bar's most recent annual report indicates that its Lawyers' Fund
for Client Protection considered no claims in 2018. See ALASKA 2018 ANNUAL REPORT,
supranote 117. The preceding year, it considered one claim, for which it paid $2,500. See
ALASKA

BAR

ASS'N,

2017

ANNUAL

REPORT,

https://alaskabar.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017-annualreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WBP3-NKAF].
Since
Maine's Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection was established in 1997, it has approved
claims in the amount of $816,567, but it does not report the victims' actual losses. See
LAwS.' FUND FOR CLIENT PROT., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 3, https://mebaroverseers.org/

complaint/Annual_Reports/2019 %20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8XXV-E3SN]. In 2019, it only received one claim, which was in the amount of $2,500. Id.
259. One additional state with a mandatory bar that almost made it into Table 1 was
Georgia, which has trust account notification and payee notification. See SURVEY OF
LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42, 44. Georgia
does not have mandatory arbitration, but it places some pressure on lawyers to
participate in fee arbitration due to the presumption concerning the fairness of the
award in enforcement proceedings if the client prevails in arbitration and the lawyer
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There are, however, some alternative explanations for this pattern.
It is conceivable that the six Northeastern states with voluntary state
bars that appear in Table 1 have more client protection measures
because lawyers steal larger amounts of client money in those states. 20
Some support for this explanation can be found in the fact that from
2017 to 2019, fifty-eight percent of the money paid by client protection
funds came from thirteen jurisdictions in the Northeast and middle
Atlantic states. 2 1 But this statistic could, instead, be due to the fact that
that these jurisdictions have client protection funds with higher claims
caps. 262 The explanation might also be due to diffusion of client
protection rules to neighboring jurisdictions. States have long
emulated other states' policies through a process known as policy
diffusion. 263 Policy diffusion is often seen in geographically proximate
states, 26 4 which may help explain why some of the Northeastern states
take similar approaches to client protection. Alternatively,
Northeastern states and California may be politically more "consumeroriented" than other parts of the country. The National Consumer Law
Center's evaluation of the states with the "best" and "worst" consumer
protection laws suggests that a state's consumer protection orientation
may help to explain why two of the jurisdictions appear in Table 1.261
did not participate. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Georgia
does not make arbitration mandatory and has an extremely low cap on its client
protection fund ($25,000), which seemingly makes it inappropriate to classify it as a
one of the most protective jurisdictions. If it had been included in Table 1, however,
the percentage of all mandatory bars that appear in that table would increase to

21.875%.
260.

See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

2017-2019, supra note

1,

at 42, 44.
261. See id. at 7.
262. In fact, the client protection funds in Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire place no per claimant cap on recoveries. See id. at

25-26.
263. See Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Ideology and Learningin Policy Diffusion, 32 AM.
POL. RES. 521, 521 (2004). This process is affected by many variables and can occur
through mechanisms including imitation and learning. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig
Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM.J. POL. Sci. 840, 841 (2008); see also
Tiffany Bergin, How and Why Do CriminalJustice Public Policies Spread Throughout U.S.
States? A Critical Review of the Diffusion Literature, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 403, 416

(2011).
264. See Bergin, supra note 263, at 405.
265. There does not appear to be a state-by-state ranking of states' consumer protection
orientations. The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has analyzed states' consumer
protection laws on a variety of measures, but it only identifies a few of the "best" and "worst"

jurisdictions.

See, e.g., NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-
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Regression analyses would be needed to more reliably test the impact
of this factor.
Perhaps more telling is Table 2, showing the jurisdictions with the
fewest client protection measures. All but one of these jurisdictions
have mandatory state bars. Three of the jurisdictions with the fewest
client protection measures (Mississippi, South Dakota, and Texas)
have instituted none of the measures discussed in this Article. It should
be noted, however, that two of those three (Mississippi and South
Dakota) also have among the weakest consumer protection laws in the
country. 266 Michigan and Minnesota are outliers in Table 2 because
their client protection funds have relatively generous per claimant
caps. While it is conceivable that some of the other jurisdictions in
Table 2 see relatively low-level lawyer defalcations, this cannot be said
of other jurisdictions like Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas. 267

STATE

EVALUATION

OF

UNFAIR

AND

DECEPTIVE

PRACTICES

https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf

LAWS

(2018),

[https://perma.cc/Z823-

L3MC]. According to the NCLC, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, and
Vermont have the most protective laws. Id. at 2-3. Only one of those Northeastern states
(Connecticut) appears in Table 1, as does Hawaii.
266. According to the NCLC, Colorado, Oregon, and South Dakota have the
weakest substantive consumer protection statutes in the country. Id. at 13. Iowa and
Mississippi provide the weakest remedies for consumers. Id. at 44. Mississippi and
South Dakota do require lawyer certification of compliance with recordkeeping rules.
This is not an ABA-recommended client protection measure, but it is tracked by the

2017-2019, supra note 1,
at 42.
267. For some Texas cases see supra note 235. For some of the defalcation cases in
Louisiana and Indiana, see Karen Kidd, HammondAttorney Suspended IndefinitelyAfter Conviction
for Stealing at Least $186,000 from Client, LA. REC. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://louisiana
record.com/stories/523756156-hammond-attorney-suspended-indefinitely-after-convictionfor-stealing-at-least-186-000-from-client [https://perma.cc/SR6Q-QD6S]; Zach Parker, Facing
ABA. See SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION

$2-Million Judgment for DefraudingBlind Client, Monroe Attorney Seeks New Trial,
OUACHITA
CITIZEN
(Feb.
17,
2021),

https://www.hannapub.com/ouachitacitizen/news/local_stateheadlines/facing-2-millionjudgment-for-defrauding-blind-client-monroe-attorney-seeks-new-trial/article_b66d6c54-

7135-11eb-b764-db7fe7f81c6f.html [https://perma.cc/MZ8Y-MKL8] (describing Louisiana
lawyer who admitted stealing more than $1.8 million from client); Martha Neil, Ex-Lawyer
Accused ofStealing.$4.5Mfrom Clients Is Now Representedby PublicDefender, A.BA.J. (Jan. 25,2013,
6:48 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex-lawyer [https://perma.cc/T6XKE7V6] (describing Indiana personal injury lawyer); Teresa Auch Schultz, ValparaisoAttorney to
PleadGuilty in Client Theft Case, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
suburbs/post-tribune/ct-ptb-valparaiso-attorney-to-plead-guilty-st-0425-20150424-story.html
(reporting on Indiana lawyer who stole more than $2 million); Dave Stafford, Suspended
Lawyer Accused of Thefts from Disabled Clients Jailed on Warrant, IND. LAw. (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/artcles/suspended-lawyer-accused-of-thefts-from-
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Table 2. Jurisdictionswith Fewest Client ProtectionMeasures268
Jurisdiction
(* indicates

CPF Limits

Written

Mandatory

Trust

Insurance

Random

Fee

Fee

Account

Payee

Audits of

Per

Notification

Trust

Claimant

mandatory
bary
bar)

Agreemen

Arbitration

Overdraft

Alabama*

x

$75,000

Indiana*

x

$15,000

Louisiana*

x

$25,000

Michigan*

x

$150,000

Minnesota

x

$150,000

Mississippi*
North

$10,000
x

$25,000

Dakota*
South

$10,000

Dakota*

$40,000

Texas*

Utah*

x

$20,000

It must be noted, however, that if one other ABA-recommended
"client protection measure" were considered-the rule regarding
disclosure of whether a lawyer carries malpractice insurance 2"-the
jurisdictions with mandatory bars would look somewhat more
protective of clients than they do in the tables provided here. South
Dakota, which has a mandatory bar and appears in Table 2, has the

(describing Indiana
[https://perma.cc/BLF7-5PPX]
disabled-clients-jailed-on-warrant
lawyer who stole more than $250,000 from clients); Dave Stafford, Justices in Tug-of-War over
Judge in Suit Accusing Ex-Lawyer of Estate Theft, IND. LAw. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.
theindianalawyer.com/articles/justices-in-tug-of-war-over-judge-in-suit-accusing-ex-lawyer-ofestate-theft [https://perma.cc/DU35-3M34] (describing Indiana lawyer who allegedly stole
more than $775,000 from a client's estate).
268. For support for the data in Table 2, see supra notes 45, 84, 184, 199 and
accompanying text; SURVEY OF LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 2017-2019, supra
note 1, at 25-26; Client Security Fund, STATE BAR OF S.D., https://www.statebarofsouth
dakota.com/client-security-fund [https://perma.cc/CCG5-PZ6P].
269. MODEL COURT RULE ON INS. DISCLOSURE (AM. BAR ASS'N 2004).
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most demanding disclosure rule in the country. 27 0 It requires
uninsured lawyers to disclose directly to clients, on firm letterhead, and
in any advertising that they do not carry professional liability
insurance. 271 The only jurisdictions that go further than the ABA's
disclosure recommendation-and require lawyers to maintain lawyer
professional liability insurance (Oregon and Idaho)-have mandatory
state bars.27 2 In Oregon, the bar proposed mandatory insurance largely
because they believed that a state professional liability fund would
result in lower insurance rates for lawyers. 273 In Idaho, however, bar
members (narrowly) approved the change on public protection
grounds. 274
Thus, there are times when mandatory state bar members will

support client protection measures rather than lawyers' interests. 275
There are also jurisdictions where mandatory state bars have less
influence on the rulemaking process than in some other states. 276
270. Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers Going Bare and Clients Going Blind, 68 FLA. L. REv. 1281,
1299-1301 (2016). In fact, insurance disclosure rules provide relatively weak client
protection-as compared to an insurance requirement-because clients often do not
understand their implications. Id. at 1325-27. But South Dakota's rule is better than
most.
271. S.D. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4(c) (2020). The State Bar's Professional Liability
Insurance Committee "felt that we owed it to clients in South Dakota to inform them if the
attorneys had malpractice insurance or not." E-mail from Jeffrey T. Sveen, former
President, South Dakota Bar, to author (Apr. 29, 2015, 17:52 EDT) (on file with author).
The committee's recommendation was approved by state bar members at its annual
meeting. See COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE STATE BAR OF SOUTH DAKOTA 55 (1999) (on file
with author).
272. See Who We Are, OSB PRO. LIAB. FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/about/who-weare.html [https://perma.cc/5NNU-ZFSJ]; 2018 Malpractice Coverage RequirementGeneral Information, IDAHO STATE BAR (2019), https://isb.idaho.gov/blog/2018malpractice-coverage-requirement [https://perma.cc/7JWA-3A6C].
273. See Daniel O'Leary, The ProfessionalLiability Fund, OR. STATE BAR BULL., June
1978, at 9 (describing an Oregon State Bar Board of Governors statement about the
benefits to lawyers of the professional liability fund).
274. See Diane K Minnich, 2016 Resolution Process-TheResults, ADvOc.,Jan. 2017, at 22.
275. This could also be seen with respect to some of the client protection measures
described in this Article. For instance, the California State Bar supported legislation
that would require written fee agreements where the fee was expected to exceed
$1,000. See Business Associations and Professions, 18 PAC. L.J. 467, 473 (1987). It is worth
noting, however, that this occurred during a period when the state bar was under
intense scrutiny by the state legislature. See RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL:
UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT

22-43

(2011).

276. In Hawaii, the supreme court appoints an independent task force and then
invites comment on the proposed rules. See, e.g., James A. Kawachika, The New Hawai'i
Rules of ProfessionalConduct: What You Absolutely Need to Know and Why-Part I, HAW. BAR
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Closer study is needed to determine whether, on balance, jurisdictions
with mandatory state bars tend to produce regulation that is less
protective of the public, and whether this occurs becauseof the activities
of the state bars. If this is the case, it is not necessarily because voluntary
state bars are more concerned with client protection. Rather, voluntary
state bars may simply have less direct influence in the rulemaking
process.
CONCLUSION

It is important to reiterate that state bar associations are just part of
this story. There are several other factors that contribute to the extent
to which client protection measures are implemented in any
jurisdiction. These include, inter alia, the state supreme court's view of
its role in lawyer regulation, the jurisdiction's rulemaking process, the
incidence of lawyer overreaching in a state, and the money available
for regulatory responses. Case studies and more fine-grained,
systematic comparisons of the political and economic conditions in
various jurisdictions would be needed to better identify why the
regulatory differences occur.277
What is evident, however, is that in some jurisdictions, individual
clients are not adequately protected, and that the courts share
responsibility for this state of affairs. Courts need to be more engaged
when considering client protection measures. They should not overrely on state bars-which are inherently self-interested organizationsto determine how to regulate lawyers. Courts should create their own
task forces to consider possible changes in lawyer regulation. These
task forces should include nonlawyer consumer advocates (and notjust
"friends of lawyers") who will speak out to protect clients' interests.
Where the courts maintain responsibility for certain client protection
measures-such as fee arbitration and client protection funds-they
should insist on receiving reports that meaningfully advise them of how
well these programs are operating. Where these programs are not
under court supervision, the courts should investigate whether they

J.,

Mar. 2014, at 4; Court Briefs, HAw. BARJ., Feb. 2011, at 22; see also HSBA Happenings,
HAw. BARD., Mar. 2019, at 15 (describing the mandatory Hawaii State Bar Association's
decision not to comment on the supreme court's proposed rule change).
277. See generally Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States, in
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 3-23 (Virginia Gray et al.
eds., 11th ed. 2018) (describing the many reasons why states make different policy
choices).
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should assume an oversight role-as the ABA recommended-to
ensure that the programs are operating in a manner that adequately
protects the public.
If courts are not willing to do this work, then they should allow the
state legislatures to step in to protect the public. Admittedly, this is
unlikely in jurisdictions where state courts maintain that they have the
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and that "any
encroachment" by the legislature is unacceptable. 278 Other courts,
however, have been more flexible, indicating a willingness to uphold
legislative regulation of the legal profession in aid of the court's
judicial functions, 279 as a matter of comity,280 or on other grounds. 281 A
few have gone further, recognizing that the legislature has its own role
to play in regulating the legal profession. 282
Thus, there seem to be openings in some states for the legislatures
to do more to protect vulnerable clients. Some courts have concluded

278.

See Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1090-93 (Pa. 2007); see also In re

Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. 1990) (referring to the court's "sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting governance of the Bar"); Injured Workers
Ass'n of Utah v. State, 374 P.3d 14, 20, 22 (Utah 2016) (noting court's authority is both
exclusive and "extensive"); State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770, 773
(Wis. 1990) (referring to "the exclusive authority of the judicial branch to define and
regulate the activities" of lawyers).
279. See In re Kaufman, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (Idaho 1949); see also Hays v. Ruther, 313

P.3d 782, 788 (Kan. 2013); Att'y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 937-38 (Md.
1981); Shenandoah Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Assessor of Jefferson Cnty., 724 S.E.2d 733,
741 (W. Va. 2012); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Cleaning up the Legal Profession: The Power to
Discipline-Thejudiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 418 (1978).
280. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 180 N.E. 725, 727 (Mass. 1932); Wolfram,
supra note 223, at 16.

281.

See, e.g., Sadler v. Or. State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Or. 1976)

(recognizing the legislature's police power to protect the public); Bester v. La. Sup.

Ct. Comm. on Bar Admission, 779 So. 2d 715, 718 (La. 2001) (indicating that the
legislature may pass laws regulating the practice of law that do not "destroy, frustrate,
or impede the court's inherent constitutional authority").

282.

See In re Att'y Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49 (Cal. 1998) (noting that court has

respected the legislature's exercise of a reasonable degree of regulation of the legal

profession); Bergman v. District of Columbia, 986 A.2d 1208, 1225 (D.C. 2010) (stating
that the court's "'primary' power" to discipline lawyers does not mean "that the
legislature is precluded from playing any role in the regulation of . .. attorneys and

the practice of law"); Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 548 (Fla. 2014) (noting that the
legislature "also possesses the inherent authority to regulate some aspects of legal
representation"); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tenn. 1994) (observing "that
areas exist in which both the legislative and judicial branch have interests, and that in
such areas both branches may exercise appropriate authority").
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that consumer protection laws of general applicability can be applied
to lawyers. 28 As one court noted, "entrepreneurial aspects of legal
practice-how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and
collected ...
[are] business aspects of the legal profession" and
therefore properly subject to the state's consumer protection act. 284
Another, when upholding the application of the state's consumer
protection statute to lawyers observed, "[w] e should not permit the
special relationship of attorneys to the judiciary to blind us to the
fundamental importance of the relationship of attorneys to their
clients." 285 Some courts have also upheld statutes specifically aimed at
protecting lawyers' clients, such as laws limiting lawyers' recoveries in
contingent fee cases 286 and setting attorneys' fee formulas in workers
compensation matters. 287

Legislatures may be able to do even more to protect vulnerable
clients. For example, they may be able to require that fee arrangements
be in writing in order for lawyers to bring suit to recover their fees
(other than on a quantum meruit basis). 288 Such a law would not
interfere with the courts' authority over lawyers in the discipline
process and would be likely to incentivize more lawyers to put their fee
agreements in writing. Legislatures should be able to require
insurance companies to provide payee notification-and are even
better positioned than courts to do so-without causing courts
concern that their authority is being usurped. Likewise, because of

283.

See Pepper v. Routh Crabtree, APC, 219 P.3d 1017, 1024-25 (Alaska 2009);
&

Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 209 (Colo. 2006); Heslin v. Conn. L. Clinic of Trantolo
Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 944-45 (Conn. 1983); Andrews & Lawrence Pro. Servs., LLC

v. Mills, 223 A.3d 947, 962-66 (Md. 2020); Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 170
(Wash. 1984). But see Cripe ex rel. Schmitz v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ill. 1998);
Beyers, 937 A.2d at 1089-93 (refusing to apply consumer protection law to lawyers).

284.
285.
286.

Short, 691 P.2d at 168.
Heslin, 461 A.2d at 945.
See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Med. Grp., Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 168-69 (Cal. 1985)

(upholding statute limiting contingent fee recovery to twenty-five percent); Newton,
878 S.W.2d at 107, 112 (upholding statute limiting contingent fee recovery by lawyers
to thirty-three percent in medical malpractice cases).
287. See, e.g., David v. Bartel Enters., 856 N.W.2d 271, 274-75 (Minn. 2014); see also

Multiple Inj. Tr. Fund v. Coburn, 386 P.3d 628, 636-39 (Okla. 2016) (enforcing
statutory fee formula in certain workers' compensation cases).
288. It seems less likely that courts would uphold statutory requirements that
lawyers submit to fee arbitration. But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(c) (West 2021)
(making arbitration mandatory for lawyers in fee disputes). In California, however, the
supreme court already accedes to significant legislative involvement in lawyer
regulation. See supra note 221; Levin, supra note 20, at 1002.
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state legislatures' role in funding the state courts, they could provide
funding for random audits and more money for client protection
funds. (Although the likelihood they would do so seems low given
other legislative priorities.)
The point here is not that it would be preferable for state
legislatures-rather than the courts-to assume responsibility for
adopting additional client protection measures. The courts have more
expertise with respect to these issues289 and more reasons to be
concerned about lawyers' conduct. Moreover, Texas's experience with
its Sunset Commission suggests that some legislators may be more
concerned about protecting corporate interests than they are about
public protection. 290 Rather, the point is that legislatures should be
able to act to better protect the public if the courts lack the time,
attention, or political will to do so. Of course, before any legislature is
likely to act, there would need to be advocates for client protection
measures. Success in the legislature would also be difficult because
state bars already bankroll entrenched lobbyists who advocate for
lawyers' interests. Yet the mere possibility that the state legislature will
act to further protect clients may induce state supreme courts and state
bars to give client protection issues more serious attention. Regardless
of whether it is the courts or the state legislatures that are ultimately
moved to act, ordinary clients need and deserve more protection from
overreaching lawyers than they are currently receiving.

289.

See Benjamin Barton, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control

LawyerRegulation-Courts,Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA. L. REv. 1167, 1240 (2003).
290. See supranotes 247-48 and accompanying text.

